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1. Introduction 
Since Schumpeter, existing literature has well established the importance of technological 
innovation as a critical driver to a nation’s long-term economic growth (Solow (1957)) and firms’ 
competitive advantage (Porter (1992)). Nevertheless, how to effectively finance and promote 
innovation remains challenging for most countries and organizations ((Hall and Lerner (2010), 
Kerr and Nanda (2014))). The financial contracting environment surrounding innovation is 
particularly challenging. Specifically, innovation is associated with severe agency problems, as it 
entails highly risky and long-term investment, often in intangible assets such as human capital, 
and results in unpredictable outcomes (Holmstrom (1989)).  
A growing literature explores the role that external capital market plays in impacting 
firm-level innovation.1 In particular, there has been a lot of debate on the bright and dark sides of 
different financial contracting instruments such as debt and equity in terms of spurring 
innovation (e.g., Aghion et al. (2013), Amore et al. (2013), Bernstein (2014), Brown et al. (2009, 
2012), Hsu et al. (2014), Robb and Robinson (2014)). The focus of these studies has been on 
how incentive problems arising from these different contracting environments impact the 
innovation outputs. Recently, the nature of innovative projects (e.g., incremental vs. radical 
innovation) impacted by financing conditions begins to receive more research attention (Akcigit 
and Kerr (2012), Chava et al. (2013), Gao et al. (2014), Nanda and Nicholas (2014), Nanda and 
Rhodes-Kropf (2010, 2013)). However, the understanding on the precise mechanism and 
channels behind the relationship between external finance and innovation is still limited.  
The goal of this paper is to deepen the understanding regarding the financing and 
innovation relationship, by identifying both a mechanism and specific channels through which 
access to finance affects innovation and by quantifying the impact of access to credit on shaping 
the distribution of innovative investment. To this end, I focus on corporate innovation. 
Corporations are important contributors to technological innovation economy wide. For instance, 
they generate a vast majority of patents in the U.S.2 Further, in the pusuit of long-term growth, 
corporations employ a spectrum of strategies from internal to external innovation, and from 
incremental to radical innovation, which render it a rich setting for examining various channels 
                                                
1 For surveys on research regarding financing and innovation, see Hall and Lerner (2010), and Kerr and Nanda 
(2014).  
2  Based on National Bureau of Economics Research (NBER) patent citation database and Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001), the patents filed by corporations are around 75% of all patents filed in the economy. 
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of innovation. The incentives and contracting issues surrounding these different organizational 
vehicles of innovation have been well discussed by the literature on innovation management 
(Aghion and Tirole (1994), Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009), Matthews and Robinson (2008), 
Robinson (2008), Stein (1997)).  
In the attempt to investigate how finance affects corporate innovation, I examine 
innovation budget allocation on channels including: R&D, acquisitions, and corporate venture 
investment. The R&D done in corporate laboratories has been a dominant feature in the 
landscape of corporate innovation, and it is generally regarded as an organic and internal way of 
conducting innovation. In addition to in-house R&D, another way for corporations to advance 
innovation is through external acquisitions of innovative targets (Bena and Li (2013), Higgins 
and Rodriguez (2006), Sevilir and Tian (2013), Zhou (2014)). Furthermore, as pointed out by 
Lerner (2012), corporations might motivate innovation through a “hybrid” model – a corporate 
venture capital (CVC) program that combines features of corporate research laboratories and 
venture-backed start-ups (Chemmanur et al. (2013), Chesbrough (2002), Chesbrough and Tucci 
(2004), Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005, 2006), Gompers and Lerner (2000)).3  
Several empirical challenges face the identification of how external financing cost affects 
innovation. First, external cost of finance is unobservable ex ante and therefore is difficult to 
quantify. Second, innovation decisions are made endogeneous with company and market 
characteristics, including financial decisions of a firm. The endogeneity makes it difficult to 
establish the causal effect external financing cost may have on innovation, as well as the 
channels through which such an effect occurs. To address the first challenge, I use the market 
value of commercial real estate owned by firms as a measure for access to credit. To overcome 
the endogeneity problems, I employ identification strategies that make use of the exogeneous 
variations in the real estate value.  
To quantify access to credit of a corporation, it is natural to use the commercial real 
estate market. First of all, real estate is an important asset for publicly traded innovative firms 
and its price variations lead to large swings of firm asset value. During the sample period of 1993 
to 2009, the market value of commercial real estate accounted for 15 percent of innovative firms’ 
                                                
3  Corporate venture capital (CVC) investment is minority equity investment in entrepreneurial start-ups by 
incumbent firms. Corporations usually structure CVC programs as corporate subsidiaries. For a thorough discussion 
of CVC, see Gompers and Lerner (2000), Lerner (2012), Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005, 2006).    
3 
 
total market value.4 Secondly, real estate is an important form of collateral. Commercial real 
estate usually has a high loan-to-value ratio (median of 82 percent of value according to 
Benmelech et al. (2005)). Compared to other types of collateral such as inventory and accounts 
receivables, real estate is easily redeployable and more likely to be pledged against debt. Finally, 
even in the presence of a first mortgage, a second lien could still be placed on real estate 
(Brueggeman and Fisher (2010)). It is particularly important in the setting of this paper, since it 
allows a firm to take advantage of the increase in real estate value to issue more debt.  
While commercial real estate potentially affects the collateral value of a firm, prior 
studies provide some intuition of how collateral pledging might influence innovation. In the 
presence of contract incompleteness, collateral increases a firm’s borrowing capacity by allowing 
lenders to seize the pledged assets in case of bankruptcy.5 Therefore, an increase in collateral 
value eases financing ex ante. Furthermore, the nature of innovation reinforces the role collateral 
plays in contracting. As summarized by Kerr and Nanda (2014), innovation is associated with 
high uncertainty (Knight (1921)), extremely skewed returns (Scherer and Harhoff (2000)), high 
information asymmetry (Holmstrom (1989)), and intangible assets (Hall and Lerner (2010)). 
These traits lead to high agency costs of debt. Meanwhile, it is difficult for debt holders to 
monitor the innovative process, since innovation does not provide many verifiable performance 
signals (Manso (2011)). While collateral pledging can be used to mitigate underinvestment 
problems ((Stulz and Johnson (1985), Bao and Kolasinski (2014)), it could become especially 
important in reducing the agency costs of debt for innovators. This is partially due to the fact that 
collateral pledging is a debt contracting mechanism that does not heavily rely on monitoring 
techniques to reduce agencies costs.6  
In order to extract exogenous variations in the market value of real estate collateral, I 
adapt the identification approach developed in prior studies (Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012), 
Cvijanovic (2014)). More precisely, I take firm-specific initial real estate holdings at the 
                                                
4 In this paper, innovative firms are defined as firms with patenting activities.  
5 See, Almeida and Campello (2007), Almeida, Campello, and Liu (2006), Barro (1976), Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989), Benmelech and Bergman (2009), Berger and Udell (1995), Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991), Chan and 
Thakor (1987), Gan (2007), Jimenez et al. (2006), Rampini and Viswanathan (2013), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Tirole (2005), etc. 
6 As an increase in the collateral value improves the overall credit access of a firm, it is worth noting that there are 
two ways for firms to finance innovation by collateral pledging. First, firms may directly finance innovation projects 
with debt secured by real estate. Second, firms can employ secured debt to finance ordinary investment, and divert 
more internal resources to innovation expenses. Here, I do not distinguish between these two alternative methods, 
since either case is consistent with the hypothesis that access to finance affects innovation. 
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beginning of the sample period, and then identify the real estate value variations stemming from 
local commercial real estate prices changes (at Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level). The 
identification comes from two sources. First, I compare innovation of land-holding firms across 
MSA areas with different local real estate prices. This allows me to abstract from aggregate 
economic fluctuations that might affect innovation of firms. Second, within an MSA area, I 
compare innovation of firms with different levels of real estate holdings. Because firms lose or 
gain collateral value proportionate to their real estate holdings prior to the price shocks, the pre-
shock real estate holdings, if randomly assigned, provide an exogenous measure of the change in 
collateral value (Gan (2007)). This method allows me to control for local economic shocks that 
could be correlated with innovation.  
There are two sources of potential endogeneity: (1) real estate holdings might be 
endogeneous decisions; (2) local real estate prices might be correlated with investment 
opportunities that also drive innovation in the area. To mitigate the first concern, I control for the 
observable determinants in the real estate ownership, including size, location, profitability, age, 
and industry of a firm. The second concern is that different areas may be hit by different price 
shocks endogenous to local innovation activity. To address the issue, I instrument local real 
estate prices by the interaction between local land supply elasticity and national occupancy rate. 
The intuition behind the instrument is straightforward: for one unit demand shock to commercial 
real estate (proxied by occupancy rate), areas with lower land supply elasticity would experience 
a larger appreciation in commercial real estate prices because housing supply can not be 
expanded easily in the area (Mian and Sufi (2011), Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008)). Local 
land supply elasticity is a measure of land availability at the MSA level developed by Saiz 
(2010), capturing both geographical constraints and zoning regulations. Occupancy rate is the 
source of demand from tenants who rent the space that leads to returns and price increases for the 
space owned by investors.  
My main finding is that collateral value is significantly positively correlated with 
corporate innovation in the subsequent five years after the real estate shock. The relationship 
between real estate collateral value and innovation is statistically significant and economically 
large. A one-standard deviation increase in real estate value increases patents filed and granted in 
the subsequent five years (citations received by patent in the subsequent five years) by 14 (13) 
percent of its standard deviation. Comparing between the results based on the OLS and IV 
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analyses, it appears that OLS biases the effect of real estate value on firm innovation upward due 
to endogeneity. This observation suggests that certain omitted variables (such as investment 
opportunities) simultaneously make firms more innovative and more likely to experience an 
increase in real estate price. Once I use the IV to clean up the correlation between real estate 
collateral and the omitted variables, the endogeneity of VC staging is largely mitigated and the 
coefficient estimate decreases. However, the effect still remains positive and significant, 
suggesting a nontrivial effect of collateral value on innovation.  
In addition to the quantity of innovation measured by number of patents and the quality 
of innovation measured by citations per patent, I examine the novelty of innovation outcome, as 
measured by originality score and generality score of patent filings. I observe an increase in the 
originality score starting from the second year after collateral shock, suggesting that filed patents 
are on average citing a wider range of industries. Finally, I compute the ratio of patents in 
industries different from the SIC 2-digit industry of the parent firm. The results suggest there is 
also an increase in the patents in different technological industries following collateral value 
increases. It implies that firms are expanding into industries with different technologies. Taken 
together, patent-based metrics suggest that firms are taking more path-breaking, radical 
innovation as a response to a collateral value increase.   
To understand the channels through which patenting activities are affected, I conduct an 
analysis of underlying channels. I find that firms increase their innovative investment through all 
three channels as a response to real estate value appreciation. The percentage increases in the 
three channels are different. For a one-standard deviation increase in the collateral value, 
acquisitions of innovative targets increase by 30 percent, followed by CVC investment (29 
percent), and then R&D investment (16 percent). It is probably because R&D has the highest 
adjustment cost (Hall and Lerner (2010)) and lowest information asymmetry among the three 
types of investment.  
I also trace the deal characteristics of acquisitions and corporate venture investment. I 
find that following collateral value increases, the acquisitions are more likely to be cash-based. 
The targets purchased in general have more patent filings and citations per patent prior to the 
acquisition. Furthermore, these targets are more likely to be in industries that are different from 
the acquirer. For corporate venture investment, there are also some interesting dynamics going 
on. Following collateral value increase, firms tend to invest in younger entrepreneurial start-ups 
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at earlier rounds. These start-ups also have a higher likelihood to be acquired ex post, and they 
are more likely to be in industries different from the incumbent firms. The evidence from the 
innovative investment channels is consistent with the patenting outcomes. It suggests that firms 
are increasing the quantity, quality and the riskiness of innovation, while expanding into 
different industry domains.   
To further refine the understanding of the effects of collateral shocks on innovation, I 
explore how real estate value affects innovation differently in the cross section. If real estate is 
pledged as collateral and mitigates financing constraints, firms subject to higher information 
asymmetry and agency problems ex-ante should experience larger shifts in innovation as a 
response to real estate price variation. However, if there is high historical local real estate price 
volatility, then firms are less likely to increase innovation following collateral value appreciation. 
In subsample tests, I indeed find that the variation in innovation is more pronounced in firms 
with more secured debt outstanding, higher credit constraints, and lower historical real estate 
price volatility. The above cross-sectional tests further lend credence to causal inferences of a 
positive effect of real estate collateral on corporate innovation. My findings are also robust to 
various regression and sample specifications.  
This paper is the first, of which I am aware, to empirically identify both the underlying 
channels (R&D, acquisitions, CVC investment) and a mechanism (collateral pledging) behind 
the financing and innovation link documented in previous studies. Overall, my findings indicate 
that collateral value not only improves the innovation rate of public firms in terms of quantity 
and quality, but also changes the trajectory of innovation away from more incremental 
innovation to experimental and radical innovations. These effects are more pronounced for firms 
that are ex-ante credit-constrained, while the effects are mitigated if the variation in the collateral 
value is likely to be temporary (measured by a high local commercial real estate price volatility).   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature. Section 3 describes sample construction and reports summary statistics. Section 4 
demonstrates the research design. Section 5 presents the baseline results on patenting activities. 
Section 6 presents results on underlying channels through which collateral shocks affect 
patenting activities. Section 7 reports cross-section results. Section 8 discusses robustness checks. 
Section 9 concludes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
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2.  Related literature  
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, at the broadest level, this 
paper is related to the literature on finance and investment. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Myers (1977) argue, with risky debt outstanding and the separation of ownership and 
management, managers have incentives to under- and overinvest in future growth opportunities, 
giving rise to the agency cost of debt. Stulz and Johnson (1985) argue that secured debt can 
alleviate the “debt-overhang” problems as documented in Myers (1977). While the agency cost 
could be particularly severe in innovative firms due to the nature of innovation (Homstrom 
(1989)), I test whether collateral pledging boosts innovation in this paper.  
Furthermore, this paper is the first one that shows how the external capital market affects 
within-firm capital allocation, through the lens of innovation budgets. Instead of using a 
simplified representation of innovation by either patents or R&D, I investigate three intermediate 
channels through which a firm increases its innovation budgets: in-house R&D, corporate 
venture capital investment, and acquisitions of innovative targets. While theory suggests that 
firms can obtain innovation by acquiring targets that are more efficient at innovation (Aghion 
and Tirole (1994)), empirical studies confirms that acquisitions create synergies for innovation 
(Bena and Li (2013), Sevilir and Tian (2012)). In addition to acquisitions, corporate venture 
capital investment has also been shown as a way to source external knowledge (e.g. Chesbrough 
(2002), Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian (2013), Dushnisty and Lenox (2005, 2006), Gompers 
and Lerner (2000), Gompers (2002), Lerner (2012), etc.). While previous literature has explored 
the relations between each channel and innovation outcomes, I fill a gap in the literature by 
investigating how the cost of external finance affects allocation of the innovation budgets 
through these channels ex ante.  
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on financial constraints and innovation. 
Prior studies recognize well the difficulty of financing innovation due to severe information and 
agency problems (Hall and Lerner (2010)). Focusing on the 1990s R&D boom, the seminal work 
of Brown et al. (2009) uncovers that finance matters for R&D and economic growth, while 
Brown et al. (2012) show that access to internal and external equity finance matters a lot for 
R&D, especially in firms that are likely to face financing constraints. However, these studies rely 
on standard investment-cash flow methods, which are likely to be subject to bias in estimations. I 
use an “ideal” experiment, in which firms are hit by funding shocks independent of investment 
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opportunities, to examine the causal effect of credit constraints on innovation. By employing 
shocks to the borrowing capacity exogenous to a firm’s investment opportunities, I am able to 
document a causal link.  
In addition to establishing the causality between access to finance and innovation, this 
paper also looks into the forms of innovation (incremental vs. radical innovation). Nanda and 
Rhodes-Kropf (2013, 2014) argue that lower financing risk spurs radical innovation. They test 
the hypothesis in the setting of a hot market for venture capital investment, and argue that hot 
market lowers the experimentation cost at early stages and allosw investors to make riskier and 
more novel investments. In this paper, I examine the hypothesis in the setting of real estate 
market and corporate innovation, and I find consistent results there.   
In particular, this paper is closely related to an emerging literature on credit financing and 
innovation. It is often argued that the structure of a debt contract could be ill-suited to finance 
innovation, since creditors do not share upside returns of projects while innovative investment is 
highly risky with skewed returns (e.g. Atnassov, Nanda, and Seru (2007), Stiglitz (1985)). 
However, debt financing may also enjoy several advantages over equity financing. While equity 
financing requires information disclosure that might provide sensitive information to competitors 
(e.g. Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983), Maksimovic and Pichler (2001)), private debt financing 
does not share this concern. In addition, short-term pressure from public markets accompanying 
equity financing often exacerbates managerial myopia and is hostile to innovation (e.g. Graham, 
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), He and Tian (2013)), while the problem is not of concern for debt 
with a long maturity structure.  
Recently, many studies show that bank financing and competition facilitated by 
deregulation promote innovation (e.g. Amore, et al. (2013), Chava et al. (2013), Cornaggia et al. 
(2014), Hombert and Matray (2013), Benfratello et al. (2008)). Moreover, Robb and Robinson 
(2014) show that new entrepreneurial firms heavily rely on external debt financing, which is 
surprisingly opposite to common beliefs. One reason could be that major creditors such as banks 
with lending expertise are better at evaluating projects, monitoring the firm, and collecting 
significant soft information about the firms, and hence promote innovation. Mann (2014) shows 
a direct channel through which credit financing spurs innovation, i.e. using s patent as collateral. 
Taken together, more studies begin to acknowledge the positive effects of debt financing on 
innovation by start-ups and mature firms. This paper is consistent with this line of studies in the 
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sense that I also show a positive effect of credit financing on innovation, and the difference is 
that I focus on the micro channel through real estate collateral. With real estate value 
appreciation, a firm could pledge collateral for debt with longer maturity (Benmelech, Garmaise, 
Moskowitz (2005), Shleifer and Vishny (1992)) and less restrictive covenants protections 
(Cvijanovi (2014)), which is especially conducive to innovation. 
Third, this paper speaks to the literature on firm boundaries and corporate resource 
allocation. This line of studies has mainly discussed the “bright side” and “dark side” of internal 
capital markets, and has implications about the optimal organizational structures of a firm (e.g., 
Hadlock et al. (2001), Lerner and Stromberg (2011), Matvos and Seru (2014), Robinson (2008), 
Schafstein and Stein (2000), Seru (2014), Stein (1997, 2003)). Instead of investigating the ex-
post impact of different organizational forms, this paper investigates the ex-ante effect of credit 
financing on a firm’s capital-allocation on investment portfolios.  
Finally, this paper is related to the literature that investigates the impact of real estate on 
real margins such as financial contracts (Bemelech et al. (2005)), capital expenditure (Gan 
(2007), Chaney et al. (2012)), financial margins such as leverage (e.g. Cvijanovic (2014), Lin 
(2014), Mian and Sufi (2011)), capital structure (Rampini and Viswanthan (2013)), cash 
holdings (Chen, Harford, and Lin (2013)), entrepreneurship (Adelino, Schoar, and Severino 
(2014)), innovation outcome (Cao et al. (2014)), and others. This paper contributes to this line of 
studies by examining a firm’s resource allocation as a response to shocks from the commercial 
real estate market through the lens of three innovation channels.  
 
3.  Data and sample characteristics  
3.1. Sample selection 
 The sample examined in this paper includes U.S. listed corporations during the period of 
1993-2009. To construct the sample, I start from COMPUSTAT firms in 1993 with non-missing 
total assets, and then I merge the National Bureau of Economics Research (NBER) patent 
citation data with the Compustat firm sample using a bridge file provided by the NBER database 
in which GVKEY is the common identifier. I exclude public firms from consideration if they do 
not have patent information documented by the NBER patent database. Then I select firms 
whose headquarters are located in the United States and exclude from the sample firms operating 
in the finance, insurance, real estate, construction and mining industries. I also require firms to 
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have available data every consecutive year as they appear in the sample, and appear at least three 
consecutive years in the sample. This leaves me with a sample of 1,633 firms, and 18,312 firm-
year observations. 
   
3.2. Variable construction 
3.2.1. Measuring innovation 
To measure the output of innovation, I follow the standards of literature and use patents 
(e.g., Acharya et al. (2014), Aghion et al. (2013), Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013)). There are 
different types of patents, including design patent, plant patent, utility patents, and others.7 For 
the purpose of the study, I restrict my attention to utility patents, which appear to be the most 
relevant measure of innovation. As a matter of fact, utility patents are called “patents for 
invention”. According to US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), approximately 90% of the 
patent documents issued by the in recent years have been utility patents.  
I compile patent citation information from several datasets. First, I extract annual patent 
and citation data from the latest version of the NBER patent database, which provides 
information on all patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) over the 
period of 1976-2006. Second, Since NBER database does not provide information about patents 
after 2006, I use patents granted over the period of 2007-2009 provided by Kogan et al. (2012).8 
Finally, I attach to patents from Kogan et al. (2012) information about citations over the period 
of 2007-2009 using the Harvard Business School (HBS) patent and inventor database.9  
Based on the information collected, I construct three measures. The first measure is a 
firm’s number of patent applications filed in a year that are eventually granted. It is argued that 
application year better captures the actual time of innovation rather than the grant year 
(Grilliches, Pakes and Hall (1988)). In addition, when a patent is associated with multiple 
assignees in different firms, I evenly distribute the patent to each firm. Though straightforward to 
compute, the number of patents does not tell one the impact of them. Hence, I construct a second 
measure capturing the importance of each patent by counting the number of citations each patent 
receives in subsequent years.    
                                                
7 For a detailed description of each type of patent, refer to the USPTO website        
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/patdesc.htm. 
8 The database constructed by Kogan et al. (2012) is available at https://iu.box.com/patents.  
9 HBS database is available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/patent.  
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 However, patent and patent citations are subject to truncation bias. There are two types of 
bias. First, there is a decrease in the number of patents observed in the last few years of sample 
period (e.g., 2005 and 2006) in the NBER patent database. It is because patents appear in the 
database only after they are granted, and on average there are two years average between the 
application year and patent granting year. Many patent applications filed in the end of the sample 
period are still under review and have not been granted by 2006. Following Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2001), I adjust patent counts using the “weight factor” computed from the 
application-grant empirical distribution. Second, the citation counts observed in the NBER 
database are only collected till 2006, though patents keep receiving citations over a long period 
of time. Following Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001), I adjust the citation counts using the shape 
of the citation-lag distribution.  
 Besides number of patents and citations per patent, I construct two citation-based 
measures following Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) and Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe 
(1997): patent originality and patent generality.10 A high originality score of patents indicates 
that patents cite patents from a wide range of technological fields. A high generality score of 
patents indicates that the citations of the patent are spread over a large number of technological 
fields. Both originality and generality measures have been used by the literature as proxies for 
the novelty of patents, and the extent to which firms are risk-taking or conservative in their 
innovation strategy (Acharya and Xu (2013), Lerner et al. (2011), Nanda and Nicholas (2014)). 
Finally, I measure industry distribution of patents. I define patents that are in a parent 
firm’s main two-digit SIC industry as related patents, and patents that are not in a parent firm’s 
main two-digit SIC industry as unrelated patents. However, USPTO adopts a patent classification 
system that assigns patents to three-digit technology classes that are based on technology 
categorization, instead of SIC industry membership based on final product categorization. To 
convert patents in each technology class to two-digit SIC codes, I use a concordance table that 
connects most USPTO technology classes to two-digit SIC codes constructed in Hsu, Tian, and 
Xu (2014). The scope (diversification) of a patent is the ratio of number of related patents to total 
number patents of a firm in one year.  
 
 
                                                
10 Refer to Appendix for definitions of generality and originality.  
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3.2.2. Measuring real estate values  
I measure firm-level real estate holdings using COMPUSTAT data, and I also obtain 
commercial real estate prices and national occupancy rate from a proprietary database.11  
 The construction of real estate variables closely follows Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar 
(2012).  First, I define real estate assets of a firm as the summation of three major categories in 
199312: Buildings, Land and Improvement, and Construction in Progress. I also subtract the book 
value of leases from these three items, to make sure the value I am capturing is real estate owned 
by the firm. Since these assets are not marked to market but valued at historical cost, I need to 
recover their market value. The procedure goes as follows. First, I estimate the average age of 
buildings for each firm base. I compute the proportion of the original value of a building claimed 
as depreciation by counting the ratio of the accumulated depreciation of buildings to the historic 
cost of buildings. Based on a depreciable life of 40 years, the average age of buildings is 40 
multiplied by the proportion. Then I estimate the market value of a firm’s real estate assets for 
each year as inflating their historical cost at the year the buildings were established by state or 
MSA level commercial real estate inflation after 1975, and CPI inflation before 1975.  
One caveat is in calculating the real estate values I made two assumptions here. The first 
assumption is that firm’s real estate assets are located in the same state where the firm’s 
headquarter is located at. It is because COMPUSTAT does not provide the geographic location 
of all the real estate held by the firm, but only the headquarter location.13 The second assumption 
is that the firms do not repurchase or sell real estate after 1993. Though it might add noise to the 
analysis, it also avoids endogeneity between real estate purchases and investment opportunities.  
 
3.2.3. Measuring acquisitions 
 I retrieve acquisitions of public firms in my sample from the SDC M&A database, 
excluding events that are not acquisitions of a majority of interest of the target’s stock. 
Specifically, I exclude spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, repurchases, 
                                                
11 I thank Dr. Jeffrey Fisher for providing me with this database.  
12 The reason I pick 1993 is because the accumulated depreciation on buildings is no longer available in 
COMPUSTAT after 1993, and I need this variable to recover the real estate value.  
13 I use the geographic distribution data from Garcia and Norli (2012) to examine the robustness of results. In 
particular, in unreported regressions, I construct a relative exposure of each firm to state-level real estate market. 
The relative exposure to real estate market is computed as the average of real estate prices across different states 
weighted by a firm’s operation exposure to each state in a year. I find that this measure of real estate market 
exposure positively and significantly affects innovation outputs. The results are available upon requests.   
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minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and privatizations, while I include 
leveraged buyouts, and tender offers. For each firm in my sample, I also compute its annual 
volume and number of M&A transactions, by aggregating the individual M&A deals taken by 
the firm in a year. However, one concern is that simply aggregating all acquisition deals together 
might include too much noise from acquisition deals, which do not serve the purpose of 
promoting the acquirers’ innovation. To address the concern, I filter the sample by only 
including targets, that generate at least one patent prior to acquisition. In order to determine 
whether the target and the parent firm are in the same industry, I trace the SIC industries of 
targets.  
 
3.2.4. Measuring corporate venture capital investment 
To identify CVC investors, I start from the universe of VC investors in the VentureXpert 
database. I only include those VC investors that are identified as “Corporate Subsidiary or 
Affiliate” and “Corporate Venture Program” in the VentureXpert database. Then I manually 
identify VCs with a unique corporate parent.14 I also retrieve all investment information for these 
CVC investors from the VentureXpert. From year 1990 and 2010, I identify 426 distinct CVC 
programs which are affiliated with 385 publicly traded parent.15  Finally, 127 CVC programs 
enter into the regression analysis, since some of the parent firms of CVC programs have missing 
real estate prices, or do not fit sample filtering process described in section 3.1.  
I also measure whether the entrepreneurial start-up invested by the corporate venture 
capital program is in the same industry with the incumbent firm. A practical difficulty, however, 
is that these start-ups are typically not associated with a SIC code since they are not yet publicly 
traded companies. Rather, they are associated with a proprietary industry classification scheme in 
VentureXpert. I manually assign a 2-digit SIC to each startup following the method introduced in 
Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005). Basically, the idea is to generate a mapping table between SIC 
code and VentureXpert industry classification scheme, by using IPO firms that are associated 
with both classifications.16 Then, I utilize this mapping table to assign 2-digit SIC codes to 
                                                
14 Basically, I use information searched on GOOGLE to identify the CVC and what its corporate parent is. Then I 
use COMPUSTAT to find the GVKEY identifier of the corporate parent.   
15 Some firms have more than one corporate venture capital programs. 
16 Refer to page 623 of Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005) for details.  
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entrepreneurial ventures. The CVC investment is considered as being in the industry different 
from the parent firm when the venture is in the same SIC 2-digit industry with the parent firm. 17 
 
3.2.5. Measuring control variables  
I construct a vector of corporate and industry characteristics to control for factors that 
affect an IPO firm’s innovation output. Following the innovation literature, I control for a vector 
of innovation variables for firm i over its fiscal year t. Control variables include cash flow 
(income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization (Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) plus R&D), firm size (the natural logarithm of net sales), firm age (the natural logarithm 
of number of years since the firm appears in COMPUSTAT), profitability (ROA), asset 
tangibility (net PPE scaled by total assets), leverage, growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q), industry 
concentration (the herfindahl index based on sales), and institutional ownership (Aghion et al. 
(2013)). Since product market competition might have a non-linear effects on innovation outputs 
(Aghion et al. (2005)), I include the squared herfindahl index in the controls. I provide detailed 
descriptions about variable definition in the Appendix.  
 
3.2.6. Summary statistics 
To minimize the effect of outliers, I winsorize all independent variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables. Panel A presents the firm-year 
level descriptive statistics used in this study at the firm-year level. For a median firm in the entire 
sample, the book value of real estate represents 9 percent of the book value of assets, which is a 
sizable fraction of the tangible assets on the balance sheet. MSA Prices are commercial real 
estate prices at a local MSA area in the current year scaled by the real estate price in 2010. 
Regarding accounting variables, an average firm has book value assets of $1.21 billion, R&D as 
8 percent of assets, leverage as 21 percent of assets, ROA as -0.01, Tobin’s Q as 2.26, 
institutional ownership as 34 percent, herfindahl index as15 percent, and 20 years old since its 
IPO date. 
                                                
17 Sometimes, one entrepreneurial venture is associated with more than one 2-digit SIC code. In this case, I assign 
one to the diversification measure if the 2-digit SIC code of the venture is the same with the parent firm, and zero 
other wise. Then I take average of the diversification measure for each venture to obtain a final measure of 
diversification.   
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I measure innovation of a firm using both innovation output proxied by patents and 
citations per patent, and innovation input measured by acquisitions, CVC investment, and R&D. 
On average, a firm in my sample files 8.4 patents (and eventually granted) each year, and each 
patent receives 5.8 citations. On average, each firm has 0.4 acquisitions each year. In other words, 
an average firm has one acquisition every 2 years. I also examine acquisitions where targets file 
at least one patent prior to acquisition. An average firm in my sample has 0.04 number of 
acquisition deals each year where targets file some patents before acquisition. In addition to the 
number of deals, I also examine the volume of deals measured by dollar amount. On average, the 
dollar amount spent on acquisitions is 4% of the book value of total assets, and dollar amount 
spent on innovative acquisitions is 1% of the book value of total assets. Regarding CVC 
investment, since only 127 firms in my sample has CVC programs, I report summary statistics 
for the subsample of firms with CVC programs. For these firms, they have 1.1 CVC investment 
each year, and the volume of their CVC investment is 10 basis point of the total book value of 
assets. Not all the firms report their R&D spending, so R&D investment for some firms is 
missing in COMPUSTAT. I replace these missing R&D investment by 0. One common 
characteristic of these innovation variables is that they are all highly skewed. The medians of 
these variables are 0 while the means are positive. To mitigate the econometric problems 
associated with a skewed dependent variable, I take natural logarithm of one plus the variable in 
the regression analysis.  
Panel B reports the geographic distribution of sample firms. My sample firms are 
distributed among 40 states. I observe that 19.9% of sample firms are headquartered in California, 
followed by Massachusetts (7.16%), New York (6.92%), and New Jersey (5.88%).   
 
4.  Research design  
4.1. Baseline specification 
I first explore the effect of real estate value changes on innovation outputs in a naïve OLS 
panel regression framework. Specifically, I estimate the following reduced form model: 
             𝐿𝑛  (𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣!,!!!~!!!! ) = 𝛽! + 𝛽!  𝑅𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛾𝑃!! + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!" + 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝜀!",          (1) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣!,!!!~!!!!  refers to the innovation output (measured by patent counts and patent 
citations) scaled by beginning-of-year assets of firm 𝑖 in the following five years.   𝑅𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒!" is 
the ratio of the market value of real estate holdings of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 to beginning-of-year assets,  
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and 𝑃!! controls for the level of real estate prices in location l (MSA) in year 𝑡, which is supposed 
to account for the overall real estate cycle effect on innovation for firms that do not own real 
estate. 𝛼! is firm fixed effect, which controls for the effect of unobserved firm characteristics on 
innovation. 𝛿! represents year fixed effect, which control for time trend in innovation. I cluster 
the standard errors at the state/MSA × year level.   
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!"  include a set of firm-specific control variables following the innovation 
literature, including cash flow, leverage, profitability, investment opportunities, market 
competition, institutional ownership, age, and tangibility of assets. Since I have scaled 
innovation and real estate value by assets, I do not control for it again in the regression.  
The coefficient 𝛽!  measures how sensitive innovation output is to real estate value. In 
particular, it measures the percentage increase in innovation when real estate value (scaled by 
beginning-of-year assets) increases by one unit.   
 
4.2. Identification 
The market value of real estate holdings is likely to be endogenous in the proposed 
setting in two ways. First, real estate prices might be correlated with unobservable investment 
opportunities, and such correlation might drive innovation outputs. Second, real estate holding 
decisions are endogenous to the firm, and hence are jointly determined by firms’ characteristics 
and investment opportunities, which might also affect innovation.   
 How would these endogeneity issues bias my results? For the first issue, if the demand of 
a firm for innovation increases, then this firm might have a higher demand for labor and other 
local activities. And if this firm is a large land-holding one, it might trigger increase in local real 
estate prices.  If this is true, then I might overestimate the sensitivity of innovation to real estate 
prices. For the second issue, I might also overestimate innovation to real estate prices sensitivity, 
since firms that are more likely to own real estate are also more sensitive to local demand shocks.   
 To address the first concern, I instrument local real estate price changes by the interaction 
of local land supply elasticity with a proxy for national demand of real estate. This methodology 
improves upon Mian and Sufi (2011) and Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) by using 
occupancy rate as a proxy for commercial real estate demand. If a building has 10 units, and 8 of 
are rented, then the occupancy rate is 80%. For commercial real estate, occupancy rate is the 
source of demand from tenants who rent the space that leads to returns and price increases for the 
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space owned by investors (e.g. Brucegeman and Fisher (2010)). A higher occupancy rate 
indicates a higher demand for commercial real estate, and it would affect the price changes in an 
MSA area through the local land supply elasticity.  
Saiz (2010) develops a measure for price elasticities of the housing stock at the MSA 
level, by using GIS techniques to measure geographical constraints on local land supply, as well 
as factors that account for endogenous restrictions on land use through zoning regulations. This 
identification strategy partially allows me to capture the effect of the real estate prices on access 
to credit for each firm, by taking advantage of the fact the high-elasticity area experience higher 
price variations compared to low-elasticity when they hit by the same real estate demand shock 
from the national level. It is because if the local supply of land were elastic, the increased 
demand would lead to more housing construction rather than higher land prices. I estimate real 
estate price percentage changes 𝑅𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑡! for MSA l in year t using the following regression 
framework:   
                 𝑅𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑡!! = 𝛾! + 𝛾!. !!"#$%&'&%!!   ×𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝑢!! ,                           (2) 
where Elasticity! is the elasticity on land supply at the MSA area l, OccupancyRate! is the 
nationwide occupancy rate of commercial real estate, α! is an MSA fixed effect, and δ! is year 
fixed effect. Then I use P!! predicted from equation (2) to compute real estate value in regression 
(1), and as control for local prices. Table 2 reports regression results of this first-stage regression. 
As one can see from the table, elasticity and interest rate have significant effects on MSA prices. 
In addition, I show the evolution of commercial real estate prices from 1990 to 2010 for MSAs 
with high and low local land supply elasticity in Figure 1. The figure shows that the boom of 
commercial real estate market was more dramatic for places with low land supply elasticity. This 
is consistent with the idea that expansion in housing supply in places with high local land supply 
elasticity put an upper bound on real estate prices.   
To address the second concern, I follow Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) by 
controlling for the determinants in the real estate ownership decisions in the estimation of 
innovation sensitivity to real estate value. Specifically, I interact initial characteristics of firm i 
which proxy for the likelihood for the firm to own real estate, X!, with real estate prices P!!, and 
control for them in the regression as fixed effects. The idea is that firms that are more likely to 
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own real estate should be more sensitive to real estate prices. The  X! is a vector of five quintiles 
of Age, Assets, Return on Assets, two-digit industry dummies and state dummies.  
Controlling for the potential bias caused by two types of endogeneity, the new baseline 
specification becomes:  𝐿𝑛   𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣!,!!!~!!!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!  𝑅𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛾𝑃!! + 𝒦! ! 𝑋!!×𝑃!! + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!" + 𝛼! + 𝛿! +𝜀!" ,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          (3)   
where REValue is real estate value computed using local prices proxied by equation (2),  P is 
predicted local prices using equation (2), X is control of initial characteristics of the firm.  
 
5.  Collateral shocks and patenting activities   
5.1. Patents and citations per patent 
Table 3 reports estimates of various specifications of equations (1) and (3). Panel A1 
reports the regressions results using LnPatt+1~t+5 as the dependent variable. Column (1) – (3) 
reports the OLS regression results, and column (4) – (6) presents IV estimates. Column (1) starts 
with the simplest estimation of equation (1) without any additional controls. Firms owning real 
estate increase their patent filings more than firms not owning real estate when real estate prices 
increase. In column (2), I add the local real estate prices and initial controls interacted with real 
estate prices that account for the observed heterogeneity in ownership decisions and its potential 
impact on the sensitivity of innovation to real estate prices. In column (3), I add standard controls 
for innovation following innovation literature in addition to real estate prices and initial controls. 
The coefficient estimates on RE Value remain positive and significant at one percent confidence 
level across all three columns. In column (4) – (6), I also gradually add in controls as in column 
(1) – (3) with IV regressions. The coefficient estimates on RE Value stay positive and significant 
at one percent confidence level across all three columns. and the magnitude gets larger compared 
to the corresponding regressions in Panel A. The baseline coefficient in column (6) is 0.767. The 
economic magnitude is sizable. A one-standard deviation increase in real estate value---which 
brings the real estate value from sample mean (the 65 percentile) to the 86 percentile---leads to a 
25 percent increase in patents filed and granted in the subsequent five years, which is 14 percent 
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of standard deviation of patent counts. 18 This change brings the patent filed and granted in the 
subsequent five years from 76 percentile to 79 percentile.  
With regard to control variables in Panel A1, firms that are larger, and those with lower 
leverage, higher Tobin’s Q, higher institutional ownership, more tangible assets, and younger file 
more patents as a response to positive collateral shocks. Firms located in MSA areas with higher 
prices are also likely to be more innovative, which is likely to be due to the fact that higher MSA 
area prices proxy for higher investment opportunities. Firms with larger sales have less 
innovation, and this is because I have scaled the dependent variable innovation by book value of 
assets. According to prior studies, small firms normally account for a disproportionate size of 
innovation since large firms are inefficient at mixing routine tasks with innovation (Holmstrom 
(1989)). These results are consistent with intuition and existing literature.  
Panel A2 presents IV estimates using patent filings year by year as the dependent variable. 
The coefficient estimates on ReValue is positive and significant for all 5 years. In Panels B1 and 
B2, I replicate the estimation performed in Panels A1 and A2 using citations per patent instead of 
patents as the dependent variable, and find qualitatively similar results. The economic magnitude 
is also sizable. A one-standard deviation increase in real estate value---which brings the real 
estate value from sample mean (the 65 percentile) to the 86 percentile---leads to a 28 percent 
increase in average citations received by a patent filed and granted in the subsequent five years, 
which is 13 percent of standard deviation of citations per patent. 19 This change brings the 
citations received by each patent filed and granted in the subsequent five years from 80 
percentile to 82 percentile. The results suggest that firms increase both their innovation quantity 
and innovation quality as a response to collateral shocks.   
 
5.2. Originality and generality 
 In addition to patent quantity and quality, I also explore the effect of collateral shocks on 
patent novelty and riskiness. Patents that cite a wider array of technology classes of patents are 
viewed as having greater originality. I thus define Originality as one minus the Herfindahl index 
                                                
18 Increasing ReValue by one standard deviation (0.324) increases LnPatt+1~t+5 by 0.767 × 0.324 = 0.248, which 
represents 0.248 × 0.129 (mean) = 0.032 number of citations per patent, and it is 14 percent of the standard deviation 
(0.229) of citations per patent. 
19 Increasing ReValue by one standard deviation (0.324) increases by LnCitePatt+1~t+5 0.886 × 0.324 = 0.287, which 
represents 0.287 × 0.156 (mean) = 0.045 number of patents, and it is 13 percent of the standard deviation (0.333) of 
patents. 
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of the three-digit technology class distribution of all the patents that the current patent cites. A 
higher patent originality score means that the patent is drawing on a more diverse array of 
existing knowledge. In a similar spirit, patents that are being cited by a wider array of technology 
classes of patents are viewed as having greater generality. Specifically, I define Generality as 
one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology class distribution of all the patents 
that cite the current patent. The greater the variable, the broader industries the current patent 
affects subsequent innovations are. Both Originality and Generality can be used to measure the 
riskiness in a firm’s pursuit of R&D and how fundamental the research is. The rationale is that 
the more fundamental and radical the research is, the more likely it is going to draw from a wide 
range of industries. It is very rare that fundamental and radical innovation comes from scientists 
work in a narrow area alone.  
Table 4 reports the 2nd-stage estimates from the 2SLS regressions for patent Generality 
and Originality. Panel A uses Originality as dependent variable. The coefficient estimates of 
ReValue are positive and significant starting from the second year after collateral shocks to fifth 
year after collateral shocks. They suggest that higher collateral value leads to higher patent 
originality. It implies that the booming real estate market encourages a firm to take more radical 
innovation, and pursues in risk-taking strategy. Panel B uses Generality as dependent variable. 
The coefficient estimates of ReValue are positive but not significantly different from zero. It 
suggests that even though firms file patents that are more fundamental and cite a wider range of 
industries, the citations of these patents are not significantly spread over a larger number of 
technological fields.  
 
5.3. Industry distribution 
 In addition to measures on the characteristics of individual patents, I examine the 
structure of patent portfolio. In particular, I focus on the industry distribution of patents, by 
examining whether collateral value increase leads to patents filed more in industries different 
from the parent firm. If firms are prone to a more risk-taking strategy of innovation, they are 
very likely to expand into industries that are different from parent firm.  
Table 5 reports the effect of collateral shocks on industry distribution of patents. The 
dependent variable is the percentage of patents that are in a different 2-digit SIC industry from 
the incumbent firm. Consistent with the conjecture, the percentage of patents in industries 
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different from the parent firm increases in the subsequent five years after a positive collateral 
shock.   
 
6.  Collateral shocks and innovative investment   
After establishing a first-order impact from collateral shocks on innovation output, I 
investigate how collateral shocks affect innovation budgets through three channels. The first one 
is in-house innovative investment --- internal R&D, the second one is external innovation --- 
acquisitions of innovative targets, and the third one is a “hybrid” model --- CVC investment that 
combines laboratory research and venture capital investment.  
Prior studies have shown that each channel contributes to innovation output respectively. 
R&D conducted in a corporate lab is probably the most widely known form of innovation. The 
literature on patent race and the endogenous growth has largely used R&D as a simplified 
representation of innovative activities in a firm. Recently more studies have argued that 
acquisitions promote innovation of the parent firm when there are synergies obtained from 
combining innovation capabilities of the acquirers and the targets (e.g. Bena and Li (2014), 
Rhodes-Kprof and Robinson (2008)). Finally, a firm may also move innovation outside its 
boundaries through CVC programs.20 Corporations operate CVC programs as subsidiaries, and 
they act as venture capitalists through CVC programs by investing in entrepreneurial start-ups. 
Prior studies suggest that CVC programs are associated with higher innovation productivity and 
firm value (Dushitsky and Lenox (2005, 2006)). The three channels, accompanied with 
exogenous variation in collateral value, provide an excellent testing laboratory for how access to 
finance affects firms’ capital allocation.  
There has been a lot of debate on the bright side and the dark side of diversification (e.g. 
Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas (2001), Lamont and Polk (2002), Scharfstein and Stein (2000)). 
In particular, Stein (1997) argues that the principal benefit of diversification is that the 
headquarters (HQ) can better channel resources within the firm from divisions with poor 
investment opportunities to divisions with more promising prospects. However, he also points 
out that internal capital market might also fail to redeploy capital to sectors with better 
investment opportunities because of information advantage enjoyed by subdivisions and the 
                                                
20Strategic alliance is also an important way for a firm to conduct its innovative activities outside of the boundaries 
(Robinson (2008)). I do study it in this paper since it is empirically difficult for me to observe a firm’s resource 
allocation on strategic alliance.   
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costs associated with evaluating and monitoring multiply projects. Finally, he shows that a 
credit-constrained firm should focus its resources and take related projects.  
While Stein (1997) fixes the cost of external finance, and derives the optimal size and 
scope of an internal capital market, I examine the comparative statics of the effects of access to 
finance on capital allocation through the internal capital market. A large literature has discussed 
the effect of internal capital market on resource allocation (e.g. Berger and Ofek (1995), Stein 
(2003)), and in particular whether internal capital market provides an important force 
countervailing financial market dislocation (Matvos and Seru (2014), Gertner, Scharfstein, and 
Stein (1994)). In this paper, instead of focusing on the ex-post effect of internal markets on 
resource allocation, I focus on how access to capital shapes the distribution of resource 
allocation ex ante.  
 
6.1. Size effect 
In this section, instead of examining the relation between innovative investment and 
outputs that have already been explored a lot by prior studies, I take a step back and investigate 
how access to capital affects a firm’s resource allocation through these three channels. To 
mitigate the concern that some acquisitions may not be made to enhance the acquirers’ 
innovation, I filter the acquisition deals by only including ones where targets generate at least 
one patent prior to acquisition. The underlying assumption is that these types of deals are made 
to promote parent firm innovation. One caveat is that innovative targets may not necessarily 
produce patents prior to acquisition, and they might just be in process of innovation and would 
file patents after being acquired. In addition, acquisitions that intend to increase the innovation of 
the acquirer may not necessarily involve acquiring targets with patents, and the human capital 
acquired from the targets could also be valuable to the acquirer. In the end there is a tradeoff 
between using all acquisition deals with noise or restricting the acquisitions deals to a small 
group, which might also induce some noise by missing some relevant deals.  
Table 4 reports the effects of collateral shocks on these three channels separately. It 
appears that a firm increases its investment on all the three channels as a response to positive 
collateral shocks, and the increase is significant at one percent level. A firm does not only 
increase the dollar amount spend on CVC investment and acquisitions, but also take more CVC 
projects and acquisition deals. As we observe an increase in patenting outcome starting from the 
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first year after collateral shock to the fifth year, an increase in the investment in three channels 
suggest that the patenting outcomes in the first year is likely to be associated with an increase in 
acquisitions which may provide some patents to the acquirer immediately. An example is 
Google’s purchase of Motorola in 2011, and Google obtained the patents of Motorola. Aside 
from a direct transfer of patents, it generally takes a longer time for innovation to reach the 
patenting stage. The synergy effects of combining the innovation capabilities of the acquirer and 
the target, the in-house R&D, and the corporate venture capital investment may take a longer 
time than one year to generate patents and are associated with patent increase in later years.    
Furthermore, the investment through three channels increases by different magnitudes. 
The percentage increase in innovative acquisitions is the most, the percentage increase in CVC 
investment is the second most, and the percentage increase in internal R&D is the least. The 
results can be explained both by information asymmetry and adjustment cost.  
The information asymmetry problem is probably most severe on acquisitions out of the 
three channels. It is generally difficult for an outsider to know the true state of a firm, and the 
nature of innovation intensifies the problem. A target could not reduce the information 
asymmetry problem by revealing much information to acquirer, since innovation loses value if it 
could be imitated after disclosure (e.g. Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983)). The information 
asymmetry gets slightly reduced in a CVC investment, since the incumbent firm could monitor 
the entrepreneurial ventures. However, given ventures conduct innovative research outside the 
boundaries of the incumbent firms, there is still a certain degree of information asymmetry. Out 
of the three channels, in-house R&D investment suffers the least from information asymmetries. 
Therefore, as collateral pledging alleviates underinvestment, a firm has incentives to accelerate 
investment in the project that suffers the most from agency problems. Acquisitions, which were 
likely greatly impeded when the firm is credit constrained, gets the highest percentage increase 
when the credit constraint is relaxed.  
The adjustment costs are also different for three types of investment. R&D probably has 
the highest adjustment cost (e.g. Lach and Schankermann (1988)). As pointed out by Hall and 
Lerner (2010), “fifty per cent or more of R&D spending is the wages and salaries of highly 
educated scientists and engineers” and “part of the resource base of the firm itself disappears 
when such workers leave or are fired”. So firms tend to smooth R&D spending over time, in 
order to avoid the costs stemming from laying off knowledgeable workers. For a CVC 
24 
 
investment, it typically takes several rounds, and it is also costly for a firm to suddenly withdraw. 
Acquisitions tend to have the lowest adjustment costs out of the three channels, and CEOs 
withdraw acquisitions sometimes. As a result, when there is a variation in capital access, a firm 
could adjust acquisition in a faster mode than the other two types of investment.   
  
6.2. Acquisitions  
 The evidence so far shows that collateral shocks have a positive effect on innovative 
investment. For acquisitions and corporate venture investment, both the dollar volume and 
number of deals increase as a response to improved credit access. In this section, I explore 
whether the characteristics of acquisition deals are affected by the collateral shocks. Table 7 
reports the effect of collateral shocks on the characteristics of acquisitions. The regressions are 
based on deal-year level. First, I find that acquisitions associated with an increase in real estate 
value are more likely to be cash-based. This lends further credence to the collateral mechanism. 
If real estate value increase results in higher borrowing capacity and firms pledge real estate to 
issue secured debt, then firms have more cash available and their acquisitions are more likely to 
be financed by cash.  
 I also examine the characteristics of targets in Table 7. It seems that targets acquired 
when the firm experiences an increase in the collateral value are more likely to be industries 
different from the SIC 2-digit industry of the parent firm. This result is consistent with evidence 
in Table 5 that patents filed following improved access to credit are more likely to spread in SIC 
2-digit industries different from the parent firm. In addition, these targets on average have higher 
patents and citations per patent prior to the acquisition. It implies that firms are more likely to 
acquire those innovative targets following relaxed financial constraints.  
  
6.3. Corporate venture capital investment  
 In addition to the characteristics of acquisitions, I examine the characteristics of corporate 
venture capital investment in Table 8. Corporate venture capital investment is equity investment 
in startups by incumbent firms. I investigate the characteristics of the startups invested by the 
incumbent firms, when there is an increase in the real estate value for incumbent firms. I find 
that these startups invested by incumbent firms when there is higher collateral value are more 
likely to be in different 2-digit SIC industries from the incumbent firms. This is consistent with 
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the findings on the industry distribution of patent filings and targets. Overall, the results imply 
that firms are taking riskier approach in the pursuit of innovation, by expanding into industries 
with different technologies.  
 In addition to industry distribution, I also investigate when the firm enters into the 
investment for entrepreneurial firms, and the age of the entrepreneurial firms when the firm 
invests. When there is an increase in the collateral value of the firm, the firm seems to enter into 
the investment in startups at earlier rounds, and invest in those younger startups. This can be 
interpreted as that the firms are taking a more risky approach in the pursuit of innovation when 
there is a relaxation of financial constraint following collateral value increase. With higher 
access to credit, they pursue more radical, path-breaking innovation through investment in 
younger startups at their earlier stages. 
 Finally, I examine the exit of these startups as an ex-post measure for their quality. 
Interestingly, these startups have a significant chance to be acquired in the end, while the chance 
of IPO or bankruptcy is insignificant for them. It indicates that these startups are of good 
innovation potential. The fact they get acquired in the end is consistent with the findings in the 
literature that firms use corporate venture capital programs to identify potential targets (Benson 
and Ziedonis (2010)).  
 Taken together, the evidence in this section suggests that following improved access to 
credit, firms shift their trajectory of innovation from incremental and sustaining innovation to 
more experimental and path-breaking innovation. They acquire more innovative targets, and also 
invest in younger, risky startups with higher innovation potential.   
 
7. Cross-sectional variations 
In the previous sections, I provide evidence that collateral shocks positively affected 
innovation. One may expect that the magnitude of this effect could differ across different firms. 
In this section, I examine the innovation implications of collateral shocks across different 
sections. I first explore the cross-sectional variation in secured debt in section 7.1. Next, in 
Section 7.2, I explore the cross-sectional heterogeneity in innovation difficulty. Then, in Section 
7.3, I explore debt the cross-sectional differences in financial constraints. In Section 7.4, I 
examine the cross-sectional differences in cash holdings. Finally, in Section 7.5, I examine the 
cross-sectional variations in local real estate volatility. 
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7.1. Secured Debt 
 An increase in real estate value has two effects on a firm. First, an appreciation of real 
estate value leads to an increase in the asset liquidation value of a firm. It boosts up the debt 
capacity, since a debt contract allows a lender to seize firm assets in the case of bankruptcy. A 
firm may issue more unsecured debt against the increase in the asset value induced by real estate 
appreciation. Second, real estate could be used as collateral for a firm to issue secured debt. As 
pointed out by Stulz and Johnson (1985), by securing new lenders with collateral, a firm would 
be able to mitigate “debt overhang” problem documented in Myers (1977).  
 Underinvestment problem could be particularly severe in innovative firms, since 
innovation is associated with acute agency problems due to the nature of it. As a result, an 
innovative firm may not be able to issue unsecured debt, and the option of issuing secured debt 
would relax its financial constraints. To test whether a firm uses real estate as collateral, I rely on 
two tests. First, I examine the effect of real estate shocks on the level of outstanding secured debt. 
If a firm does use real estate as collateral, we should observe an increase in secured debt 
issuance.21  Second, I examine whether the effects of collateral shocks on innovation are more 
pronounced in groups of firms that are more dependent on secured debt borrowing. If collateral 
pledging is important for financing innovation, we shall observe a higher increase in innovation 
as a response to real estate appreciate for firms with higher levels of secured debt.22  
 Table A1 shows the response of the capital structure to real estate shocks. As we can see 
in column (3) and column (4), there is an increase in the level of long-term secured debt, and a 
decrease in the level of long-term unsecured debt. The results suggest that the firm is using real 
estate as collateral to issue new secured debt. Aside from secured and unsecured debt, Table A1 
also shows that, following real estate value appreciation there is an increase in net long-term debt 
issuance and net short-term debt issuance. This is probably because that real estate loans are of 
longer maturity compared to other loans. Finally, Table A1 also shows that there is no increase in 
equity issuance as a response to real estate value appreciation.  
                                                
21 Since COMPUSTAT only reports the level of outstanding long-term secured debt, I have to rely on that. Ideally, it 
would be better that I can examine the issuance of secured debt.  
22 It is possible that a firm does not directly use real estate collateral to finance innovation, but use it to finance 
capital expenditure. Even so, some of the previously occupied resources are released now and allow a firm to 
increase its input in innovation. I do not distinguish these two cases in this study, since either case is consistent with 
the idea that an increase in access to capital allows more innovative investment of a firm.  
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Panel A in Table 9 presents cross-sectional variations of the IV estimates using secured 
debt reliance to split samples. Secured debt category assignments use the ratio of long-term 
secured debt outstanding to total long-term debt outstanding in the current year, where firms 
above the median of the ratio are regarded as those with more collateral pledging and firms 
below the median are assigned as less collateral pledging firms. The results suggest that firms 
that issue more secured debt have a higher sensitivity of patents and citations per patent to real 
estate shocks.   It is consistent with the hypothesis collateral pledging mitigates underinvestment 
problems for innovative firms.  
 
7.2. Innovation difficulty 
Firms in industries with higher innovation difficulty might require more resources to 
innovate, and hence they might face stricter financial constraints. In this section, I examine 
whether the effect of collateral shocks on innovation is driven by firms in industries which are 
more demanding innovation. As in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005), more demanding 
industries include pharmaceutical, medical instrumentation, chemicals, computers, 
communications, and electrical industries, and the rest are classified as less demanding industries, 
which include software programming, internet applications, and other low-tech industries. I 
group firms in the industries that are more difficult to achieve innovation and that are less 
difficult to achieve innovation following standard methods in the literature (e.g. Tian and Wang 
(2014), Mao, Tian, and Yu (2013)).  
Panel B in Table 9 reports the IV estimation results for two subsamples of firms. I 
observe that collateral shocks significantly affect patents and citations in industries that are more 
difficult to innovate, and collateral shocks only affect patent counts in industries where 
innovation is less difficult to achieve. In addition, the magnitude of the effects is smaller in less 
demanding industries.  
 
7.3. Ex-ante financial constraints 
 To provide more direct evidence on whether financial constraints are the underlying force 
for the changes in the firm’s innovation output, I examine in this subsection how the change in 
innovation output upon collateral shocks differs among firms being subject to different degrees 
of financial constraints. If firms indeed pledge the increased collateral value for more borrowing, 
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I expect that firms with higher financial constraints would benefit more from collateral value 
increases and get hurt more from collateral value drops.  
 To test the hypothesis, I divide firms into financially constrained groups and financially 
unconstrained groups according and repeat the regressions in Eq. (3). I use three measures for 
financial constraint, including firm size, dividend payout policy, and bond ratings. Dividend 
payout ratio is computed as dividends on common stocks divided by income before 
extraordinary items adjusted for common stock equivalents. I put a firm in the constrained 
category in it does not pay dividend are regarded as constrained firms, and firms paying dividend 
are unconstrained firms. A firm is regarded as financially constrained if the size of its book 
assets falls in the bottom tercile of the whole distribution, and unconstrained   if the size of its 
book assets falls in the top tercile of the whole distribution. Firms without bond rating (splticrm) 
are categorized as financially constrained, and financially unconstrained firms are those whose 
bonds are rated.  
 Panel C1 and Panel C2 in Table 9 report subsample results for firms facing different 
financial constraints. The dependent variables in Panel C1 are patents per firm as a measure of 
the quantity of innovation, and citations per patent as a measure of the quality of innovation. 
Across all the measures of financial constraint, I consistently find that the estimated coefficients 
of ReValue are significantly larger in the constrained firms than unconstrained firms. In addition, 
I also run a t-test of equality of the ReValue coefficients between the constrained sample and the 
unconstrained sample, and I find that the difference between the coefficients is significant at the 
1 percent level for all three measures of credit constraints.  
 One issue that is worth noticing is that though patent count and citations appear to be 
more sensitive to collateral shocks in the subsample where firms face higher financial constraints, 
the results are not entirely driven by financially constrained firms. Firms that face relatively less 
tight financial constraint also experience increase in innovation as a response to collateral shocks.  
 
7.4. Cash holdings 
 In this section, I examine the effect of collateral shocks on cash holdings of a firm. If 
firms have enough internal fund for financing innovation, then innovation in a firm should not be 
sensitive to collateral shocks. In other words, if firms are generally financially constrained, we 
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shall expect to the effect of collateral shocks on innovation more pronounced for firms with low 
internal fund. I use annual cash holdings to proxy for a firm’s internal fund.  
 Panel D in Table 9 reports the 2nd. stage regression results of collateral values on 
innovation for low cash holding and high cash holding firms. Consistent with the conjecture, real 
estate price variables have a larger impact on the subgroup of firms with lower cash holdings.  
 
7.5. Historical real estate price volatility 
 Finally, I look at local real estate price volatility. If firms are located in an MSA with a 
history of high real estate price fluctuations, then the collateral value of their real estate is worth 
less to banks. In other words, banks would lend less against the same level of real estate in MSA 
areas with high historical local real estate price fluctuations. I directly test this conjecture in this 
subsection, as a further verification of the identification strategy.  
  I measure local real estate price volatility by the standard deviation of the commercial 
real estate price index in the previous five years for a given MSA area. Then I divide the firms 
into two groups according to their local real estate price volatility. If their local real estate price 
volatility is higher than the median of local real estate price volatility for all firms in a given year, 
then I assign the firm into the group with high real estate price volatility, and vice versa. 
Consistent with the conjecture, Panel E in Table 9 shows that the effect of collateral shocks on 
innovation is more pronounced for the subset of firms located in MSAs with low real estate price 
volatility.  
 Overall, the cross-sectional tests further lend credence to the causal inferences of the 
positive effect of collateral value on corporate innovation. While it is possible that some omitted 
variables drive the documented results, it is difficult to conceive of an omitted variable that 
biases the results equally along all cross-sections. The differential effects of collateral shocks on 
innovation along these dimensions alleviate the identification concern to some extent, as my 
results are unlikely to be entirely driven by an omitted variable that decides real estate prices and 
innovation simultaneously. Instead, it appears to suggest that a treatment effect is at least 
partially at play.  
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8.  Robustness checks 
8.1 Exclusion restrictions  
 In my identification strategy, I use local land supply elasticity to instrument for local 
commercial real estate price growth. Local land supply elasticity is a geography-based measure 
developed by Saiz (2010). Geographical constraints (e.g. steep-sloped terrain) affect land supply 
elasticity both directly and indirectly: (1) geographical constraints directly limit the amount of 
land available for real estate developers; (2) geographical constraints indirectly impose higher 
incentives for antigrowth regulations via increased land values. Either way, local land supply 
elasticity puts an upper bound on the growth of real estate prices in a local area by restricting the 
expansion of real estate property volumes.  
The identification assumption here is that local land supply elasticity is exogenous to 
local demand shocks. If the assumption is true, price growth instrumented by local land supply 
elasticity is orthogonal to factors that might drive innovation growth in an area. By this argument, 
the difference in innovation growth in two MSA areas is purely driven by different real estate 
price growth instead of some differential economic trends. Therefore, the innovation difference 
for firms across different MSA areas is likely to be driven by differential increases in the 
collateral value. A potential drawback of this argument is that MSA areas with different local 
land supply elasticity might be subject to different demand shocks.  If an inelastic MSA area is 
more likely to be subject to higher investment opportunity shocks, then the growth in innovation 
and real estate prices could be naturally correlated. As a result, what I am capturing could be just 
spurious correlations between innovation and real estate prices.  
Mian and Sufi (2011) and Cvijanovic (2014) have excellent discussions confirming the 
validity of the exclusion restrictions. They invesigate the economic trends in elastic and inelastic 
MSA areas (Mian and Sufi (2011) focus on 2002-2006, and Cvijanovic (2014) focuses on 1993-
2006). More precisely, they examine local land supply elasticity and MSA-level economic 
indicators including: real GDP growth, per capita GDP growth, disposable personal income 
growth, per capital income growth, and wage growth. In addition, Mian and Sufi (2011) examine 
the shocks to these economic indicators. The obtained evidence of them suggests that elastic and 
inelastic metro areas were not experiencing different economic trends that may have driven 
corporate or individual borrowing in their sample periods.  
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8.2 Other robustness checks 
Table A2 provides various robustness checks of the baseline estimation of equation of 
equation (3). I use both patent and citation per patent as the dependent variables, measured 
during the 5-year period post collateral shocks. A higher number of patents indicates higher 
quantity of innovation output, and a higher number of citations per patent indicates higher 
quality of innovation output.  
Panel A reproduces the estimations on two different subsamples of firms: firms with their 
headquarters in California or Massachusetts in column (2) and (4), firms with their headquarters 
outside California or Massachusetts in column (1) and (3). This panel addresses the potential 
concern about reverse causality. Firms that are located in California or Massachusetts are most 
likely to be subject to reverse causality problem, since there are many innovative firms in the 
area and it is likely that their innovation drives real estate prices in the area. The coefficient 
estimates is positive and significant at 1 percent level in both subsamples. Interestingly, the 
magnitude of the coefficient appears to be larger in the subsample of firms the headquarters of 
which are not in California or Massachusetts, and it is not statistically different from, the 
coefficient estimated on the entire sample (0.820 compared to 0.767, and 0.883 compared to 
0.886). Neither the significance not the magnitude of the coefficient of interest seems to come 
from the subsample of firms that are headquartered at California of Massachusetts.  
Panel B estimates equation (3) for two subsamples of firms: small firms in large MSAs in 
column (1) and (3), large firms in small MSAs in column (2) and (4). This specification also 
addresses the concern of reverse causality. It is likely that large firm’s innovation affect real 
estate prices in the local area especially when it is not a large MSA. Small firms in large MSAs 
would suffer less from this type of reverse causality. For small firms, I consider firms in the 
lower three quartiles of size, and in the largest 20 MSAs. For large firms, I consider only firms in 
top quartile of size, and in the MSAs smaller than the largest 20 MSAs. The estimated coefficient 
remains significant at 1 percent level for patents and citations for small firms in large cities. 
While the magnitude of patent measure is smaller than the full sample, the magnitude of citation 
measure is higher than the full sample. It seems unlikely that large firms in small MSAs drive the 
results. 
Panel C reproduces the estimation on two different subsample periods: before 2000 in 
column (1) and (3), and after 2001 in column (2) and (4). A potential concern with pooled 
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regressions as the ones presented in Table 3 is that they ignore the time-variation of sensitivities 
of innovation to collateral shocks. So I estimate equation (3) separately on two different sub 
periods, 1993-2000, and 2001 to 2009.  The estimated coefficients are positive and significant at 
1 percent level for both sub periods, with the magnitude in 2001-2009 higher than in 1993-2000. 
It might be related to the higher volatility of real estate prices in the later period. Overall, neither 
the significance nor the magnitude of full sample results seems to come from a particular time 
period. 
Panel D estimates equation (3) replacing ReValue by ReOwn. ReOwn is the interaction of 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 when a firm owns real estate initially and commercial real 
estate price index at the MSA level. The tests in this panel are designed to examine whether the 
empirical distribution of real estate value affects results. The coefficient estimates are positive 
and significant, indicating that my results are not driven by large real estate holding firms. The 
magnitude of coefficients implied by the dummy regressions is also very similar to specification 
that uses the value of real estate in Table 3. The results in this panel lend further support to the 
validity of the main empirical framework.   
 
9.  Conclusion 
In this paper, I aim to tackle the question that how external financing cost affects the way 
a corporation innovates. Using plausibly exogenous variation in the real estate collateral value as 
shocks to credit constraints, I find that the relaxation of credit constraints spurs a firm’s patenting 
outcomes through three channels: R&D, acquisitions of innovative targets, and CVC investment. 
Among these three channels, acquisitions enjoy the largest increase, CVC investment 
experiences the second largest increase, and R&D has the least increase. I further show that, 
following improved credit access firms begin to take a riskier approach in the pursuit of 
innovation, and invest more in radical innovation. Finally, subsample analysis shows that the 
increases in innovation is more pronounced for firms that are credit constrained, issue more 
secured debt, in industries where innovation is more difficult to achieve, or in MSA areas with 
lower historical real estate price volatility. 
 My paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper is the first one that 
combines the three innovation channels, and examines how access to finance affects resource 
allocations through these three channels. Second, this paper examines the forms of innovation 
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(incremental vs. radical) as a response to collateral shocks, in addition to the level of innovation. 
Innovation provides a nice testing avenue since the agency problems are particularly severe, and 
the data on patents and the three channels allows me to explore in a granular level the industry 
diversification of the investment. Third, this paper contributes to the emerging literature on credit 
constraints and corporate innovation. In particular, I use firm-level real estate collateral to 
investigate the causal impact of credit access on innovation through the micro channel.  
While I show a positive effect of credit access on firm innovation, one needs to be 
cautious in interpreting the results. It is possible that collateral pledging mitigates 
underinvestment problems. However, I cannot rule out the possibility that managers use 
collateral to take extra risk. It is extremely difficult to empirically test whether a firm over 
invests due to the lack of a benchmark– a firm’s optimal level of investment mix.  
To take one step further toward a normative conclusion, I rely on prior literature. As 
shown by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajenberg (2005), patent citations are significantly positively related 
to a firm’s market value, measured by its Tobin’s Q. More precisely, they find that an extra 
citation per patent boosts a firm’s market value by 3%. As this paper shows higher citations per 
patent, it is consistent with the hypothesis that a firm’s market value increases following real 
estate value appreciate. However, we still need to remain cautious in interpreting the results in 
this paper.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Variable Definition 
Measures of innovation 
LnPatt+1~t+5 𝐿𝑛  ( !!!"#$%!!!!~!!!!"#$%%$%#!!"!!"#$  !""#  !""#$") , where 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡!!!~!!!  is the 
total number of patents a firm filed (and eventually granted) in 
the subsequent five years.  
LnCitePatt+1~t+5 𝐿𝑛  ( !!!"#$%&#!!!~!!!!"#$%%$%#!!"!!"#$  !""#  !""#$"), where 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡!!!~!!! is the 
total number of citations received on a firm’s patents filed (and 
eventually granted) scaled by the number of by the number of the 
patents filed (and eventually granted) in the subsequent five 
years.  
LnPatt+i 𝐿𝑛  ( !!!"#$%!!!!!"#$%%!"#!!"!!"#$  !""#  !""#$"), where 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡!!!  is the total 
number of patents a firm filed (and eventually granted) in year 
t+i.  
LnCitePatt+i 𝐿𝑛  ( !!!"#$%&#!!!!"#$%%$%#!!"!!"#$  !""#  !""#$"), where 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡!!! is the total 
number of citations received on a firm’s patents filed (and 
eventually granted) scaled by the number of by the number of the 
patents filed (and eventually granted) in year t+i.  
Generalityt+i One minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology 
class distribution of all the patents that cite a given patent. I then 
take the average for all patents generated by a firm in year t+i.  
Originalityt+i One minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology 
class distribution of all the patents that a given patent cites. I then 
take the average for all patents generated by a firm in year t+i. 
Measures of real estate  
ReValue The market value of real estate assets normalized by book value 
of assets (See Section 3.2.2 for the construction of the variable) 
at the beginning of a year for a firm in a given year. This variable 
is constructed using industrial commercial real estate prices at 
the MSA level and the state level. The market value of real estate 
is measured in millions of dollars.  
ReOwn The interaction of a dummy that equals to 1 when a firm initially 
owns real estate assets and the real estate price index. 
MSA Prices Industrial commercial real estate prices at the MSA level in a 
given year. 
OccupancyRate The number of units in a building that have been rented out as a 
ratio of the total number of units in the building. It is measured at 
national level in a given year. 
Elasticity Local housing supply elasticity at the MSA level in a given year 
(Saiz (2010)). 
Measures of acquisitions 
AcqVol (Innov) Transaction value of “innovative” acquisition deals (measured in 
millions of dollars) undertaken by a firm in a given year scaled 
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by beginning-of-year assets. “Innovative” acquisition deals refer 
to acquisitions refer to acquisitions where targets produce at least 
one patent prior to acquisition.  
AcqCount (Innov) The number of “innovative” acquisition deals undertaken by a 
firm in a given year. “Innovative” acquisition deals refer to 
acquisitions where targets produce at least one patent prior to 
acquisition.  
Measures of CVC investment  
CvcVol The amount of investment undertaken by CVC fund of a firm in 
a given year scaled by beginning-of-year assets.  
CvcCount The numbers of deals undertaken by CVC fund of a firm in a 
given year. 
Measures of firm characteristics 
CashAssets Income before extraordinary items and depreciation and 
amortization (Kaplan and Zingales (1997) plus R&D expenditure 
scaled by beginning-of-year assets. 
Age The difference between current year and a firm’s founding year.  
Rd Research and development (R&D) expenditure, scaled by book 
value of beginning-of-year assets. This variable is set to 0 if 
missing.  
SaleAssets Sales scaled by the beginning-of-year assets. 
ROA Return on assets ratio defined as operating income before 
depreciation, scaled by book value of total assets, measured at 
the beginning of the fiscal year.  
PPEAssets Property, plant & equipment, scaled by book value of total assets 
measured at the end of the fiscal year.  
Leverage Book value of debt divided by book value of total assets, 
measured at the end of the fiscal year.  
InstOwn Institutional holdings of shares of a firm during the year, 
calculated as the arithmetic mean of the four quarterly 
institutional holdings reported through form 13F.  
HIndex The Herfindahl index of the industry where a firm operates, 
measured at the end of the fiscal year. Industry classification is 
based on the two-digit SIC code. 
NetltIssue Long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt repayment 
normalized by beginning of year assets.  
NetStIssue The changes in current debt normalized by beginning-of-year 
assets a given year.  
NetStkIssue Common stock issuance minus share repurchases and dividend 
payout normalized by the book value of beginning-of-year 
assets.  
NetFinancing NetLtIssue + NetStIssue + NetStkIssue. 
SecureD Secured debt outstanding normalized by the book value of 
beginning-of-year assets at the beginning of a given year.  
UnSecureD Unsecured debt outstanding normalized by the book value of 
beginning-of-year assets at the beginning of a given year.  
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Figure 1. Relative evolution of industrial prices (high versus low elasticity MSA, 1993-2009). 
This figure shows the average industrial price index (normalized to 100 in 1993) for MSAs in the 
bottom quartile of land supply elasticity (“Low elasticity”) and MSAs in the top quartile of land 
supply elasticity (“High elasticity”). 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for firm-year observations of the variables used 
in the paper. The definitions of variables are listed in the Appendix.  
 
Panel A: Firm-year level variables 
 
Variable Mean Median SD 25th  75th  N 
Innovation variables             
Pat 8.387 0 23.861 0 3.247 18,312 
CitePat  5.843 0 10.873 0 7.585 18,312 
Real estate variables       
ReValue 0.232 0.092 0.324 0 0.344 15,077 
MSA Prices 0.679 0.661 0.209 0.503 0.820 15,547 
Elasticity 1.099 0.860 0.618 0.650 1.180 15,686 
Acquisition variables       
AcqCount  0.395 0 1.015 0 0 18,312 
AcqCount (Innov) 0.049 0 0.251 0 0 18,312 
AcqVol  0.043 0 0.177 0 0 16,615 
AcqVol (Innov) 0.011 0 0.102 0 0 17,848 
CVC variables (for the subsample of firms with CVC programs) 
CvcCount  1.110 0 2.455 0 1 1,643 
CvcVol 0.001 0 0.005 0 0 1,626 
Other variables             
Rd 0.089 0.035 0.122 0 0.123 18,058 
CashAssets 0.100 0.120 0.183 0.035 0.200 17,961 
ROA -0.011 0.068 0.237 -0.039 0.127 18,128 
Leverage 0.208 0.174 0.195 0.023 0.329 18,143 
Hindex 0.159 0.086 0.201 0.016 0.219 18,312 
InstOwn 0.336 0.279 0.314 0 0.611 16,478 
TobinQ 2.267 1.642 1.657 1.174 2.641 17,449 
SaleAssets 1.178 1.120 0.639 0.742 1.563 18,012 
Age 20 18 12 10 33 18,312 
Assets (million) 1,217 153 2,472 30.773 899.877 18,199 
PPEAssets 0.262 0.234 0.180 0.112 0.373 18,023 
NetLtIssue 0.013 0 0.074 -0.017 0.014 16,840 
StIssue 0.001 0 0.019 0 0 18,058 
LtSecureD 0.054 0.001 0.100 0.000 0.053 16,548 
NetStkIssue 0.039 0 0.168 -0.023 0.011 16,134 
NetFinancing 0.006 0 0.020 0 0 15,136 
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Panel B: Geographic distribution of firms 
State % of Firms 
AL 0.43% 
AZ 0.86% 
CA 19.90% 
CO 2.14% 
CT 3.00% 
DC 0.12% 
DE 0.37% 
FL 2.63% 
GA 2.57% 
IA 0.43% 
ID 0.06% 
IL 5.39% 
IN 1.47% 
KS 0.55% 
KY 0.37% 
LA 0.31% 
MA 7.16% 
MD 1.84% 
MI 3.37% 
MN 3.98% 
MO 1.59% 
MT 0.06% 
NC 2.27% 
NH 0.24% 
NJ 5.88% 
NV 0.80% 
NY 6.92% 
OH 4.16% 
OK 0.37% 
OR 1.41% 
PA 4.72% 
RI 0.37% 
SC 0.49% 
TN 0.86% 
TX 5.76% 
UT 0.86% 
VA 2.20% 
VT 0.06% 
WA 2.08% 
WI 1.96% 
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Table 2:  
First-stage regression 
This table reports the first-stage regression results. The dependent variable is the 
percentage change of industrial commercial real estate price. The independent variable the 
interaction of real occupancy rate interacted with the local elasticity of land supply developed by 
Siaz (2010). Definitions of variables are listed in the Appendix. Robust standard errors clustered 
by MSA are displayed in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Dep. Var. MSA Price Changes 
    !!"#$%&'&%( × OccupancyRate               0.010*** 
  (0.002) 
Year FE Yes 
MSA FE Yes 
Observations 1,953 
Adjusted R2 0.897 
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Table 3  
Patent count and citations per patent 
This table reports the effect of collateral shocks on patent counts and citations per patent. 
In Panel A1, the dependent variable is LnPatt+1~t+5. In Panel A2, the dependent variable is 
LnPatt+i. In Panel B1, the dependent variable is LnCitePatt+1~t+5. In Panel B2, the dependent 
variable is LnCitePatt+i. In Panels A1 and B1, column (1) – (3) presents OLS regression results, 
and column (4) – (6) presents IV regression estimates. In Panels A2 and B2, all columns present 
IV estimates. Init. Controls × RePrice are fixed effects computed as firm-level initial 
characteristics (five quintiles of age, asset, ROA, two-digit industry, and state of headquarter 
location) interacted with industrial commercial real estate prices. Definitions of variables are 
listed in the Appendix. In the IV specifications, standard errors are bootstrapped within MSA-
year level, and are displayed in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
 
 
  
46 
 
Panel A1: Aggregate patents in subsequent five years   
Dep. Var. LnPatt+1~t+5 
 OLS  IV 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
ReValue 2.125*** 2.271*** 0.821***  2.088*** 2.222*** 0.767*** 
 (0.096) (0.098) (0.114)  (0.093) (0.096) (0.111) 
CashAssets   0.834***    0.830*** 
   (0.101)    (0.100) 
Leverage   -0.156**    -0.179** 
   (0.077)    (0.077) 
ROA   0.238**    0.254*** 
   (0.100)    (0.098) 
TobinQ   0.123***    0.124*** 
   (0.008)    (0.008) 
Hindex   0.079    0.041 
   (0.134)    (0.135) 
Hindex Squared   -0.072    0.022 
   (0.202)    (0.203) 
InstOwn   -0.541***    -0.578*** 
   (0.076)    (0.078) 
LnAge   -0.363***    -0.151 
   (0.107)    (0.128) 
PPEAssets   1.400***    1.449*** 
   (0.102)    (0.100) 
LnSales   -0.604***    -0.605*** 
   (0.022)    (0.023) 
MSA Prices  -14.290*** -11.501**   0.226 1.906 
  (5.045) (5.172)   (3.431) (4.137) 
Init. Controls × RePrice           NO YES YES  NO YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 12,223 11,917 11,376  12,223 11,917 11,376 
Adjusted R2 0.828 0.843 0.864  0.828 0.846 0.866 
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Panel A2: Patents by individual years 
 
 
 
  
Dep. Var. LnPatt+i 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ReValue 0.716*** 0.790*** 0.838*** 0.947*** 0.988*** 
 (0.092) (0.091) (0.086) (0.089) (0.097) 
CashAssets 0.810*** 0.685*** 0.814*** 0.848*** 0.778*** 
 (0.089) (0.093) (0.094) (0.098) (0.084) 
Leverage -0.155** -0.145** -0.146** -0.102 -0.025 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.067) (0.069) 
ROA 0.081 0.310*** 0.179** 0.223** 0.268*** 
 (0.091) (0.097) (0.090) (0.095) (0.089) 
TobinQ 0.125*** 0.139*** 0.127*** 0.118*** 0.103*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Hindex 0.085 -0.115 0.100 0.021 0.002 
 (0.109) (0.111) (0.114) (0.118) (0.121) 
Hindex Squared 0.079 0.306* -0.006 0.094 0.010 
 (0.153) (0.165) (0.165) (0.169) (0.181) 
InstOwn -0.215*** -0.428*** -0.540*** -0.586*** -0.583*** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063) (0.066) 
LnAge -0.303*** -0.258** -0.260** -0.207* -0.304*** 
 (0.104) (0.103) (0.110) (0.114) (0.116) 
PPEAssets 1.485*** 1.480*** 1.407*** 1.421*** 1.380*** 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.095) (0.091) (0.096) 
LnSales -0.563*** -0.594*** -0.612*** -0.636*** -0.656*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
MSA Prices 2.132 1.231 2.724 5.070** 9.832*** 
 (2.488) (2.497) (2.377) (2.574) (2.534) 
Init. Controls × RePrice           YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 12,690 12,690 12,607 12,006 11,376 
Adjusted R2 0.874 0.869 0.872 0.877 0.884 
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Panel B1: Citations per patent in subsequent five years 
 
  
Dep. Var. LnCitePatt+1~t+5 
 OLS  IV 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
ReValue 2.332*** 2.545*** 0.933***  2.311*** 2.500*** 0.886*** 
 (0.092) (0.088) (0.111)  (0.086) (0.088) (0.109) 
CashAssets   0.834***    0.832*** 
   (0.119)    (0.118) 
Leverage   -0.097    -0.092 
   (0.084)    (0.084) 
ROA   0.199*    0.215* 
   (0.115)    (0.114) 
TobinQ   0.132***    0.135*** 
   (0.009)    (0.009) 
Hindex   0.269**    0.271** 
   (0.132)    (0.131) 
Hindex Squared   -0.525***    -0.528*** 
   (0.181)    (0.177) 
InstOwn   -0.616***    -0.619*** 
   (0.076)    (0.078) 
LnAge   -0.844***    -0.972*** 
   (0.123)    (0.149) 
PPEAssets   1.562***    1.553*** 
   (0.120)    (0.121) 
LnSales   -0.651***    -0.655*** 
   (0.026)    (0.026) 
MSA Prices  0.679 5.480   8.877*** 15.243*** 
  (4.918) (7.126)   (2.173) (2.839) 
Init. Controls × RePrice           NO YES YES  NO YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 12,223 11,917 11,376  12,223 11,917 11,376 
Adjusted R2 0.851 0.870 0.892  0.852 0.872 0.893 
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Panel B2: Citations per patent by individual years 
 
 
Dep. Var. LnCitePatt+1~t+5 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ReValue 0.780*** 0.867*** 0.859*** 0.980*** 1.057*** 
 (0.103) (0.107) (0.101) (0.095) (0.101) 
CashAssets 0.925*** 0.751*** 0.928*** 0.964*** 0.731*** 
 (0.132) (0.116) (0.118) (0.111) (0.108) 
Leverage -0.109 -0.075 -0.126 -0.118 0.014 
 (0.094) (0.088) (0.081) (0.078) (0.078) 
ROA 0.149 0.277** 0.049 0.138 0.291*** 
 (0.130) (0.121) (0.119) (0.110) (0.108) 
TobinQ 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.136*** 0.119*** 0.098*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
Hindex 0.265* 0.065 0.099 0.050 0.247** 
 (0.158) (0.142) (0.133) (0.127) (0.123) 
Hindex Squared -0.143 -0.053 -0.186 -0.061 -0.426** 
 (0.206) (0.197) (0.184) (0.180) (0.179) 
InstOwn -0.354*** -0.556*** -0.626*** -0.667*** -0.631*** 
 (0.074) (0.072) (0.069) (0.068) (0.071) 
LnAge -0.227* -0.418*** -0.507*** -0.582*** -0.782*** 
 (0.131) (0.134) (0.136) (0.157) (0.156) 
PPEAssets 1.320*** 1.568*** 1.590*** 1.362*** 1.305*** 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.123) (0.109) (0.114) 
LnSales -0.613*** -0.627*** -0.637*** -0.667*** -0.701*** 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) 
MSA Prices 6.190** 7.831*** 10.297*** 14.127*** 17.288*** 
 (2.716) (2.466) (2.211) (2.203) (1.927) 
Init. Controls × RePrice           YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 12,690 12,690 12,607 12,006 11,376 
Adjusted R2 0.847 0.856 0.872 0.886 0.897 
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Table 4 
Originality and generality 
This table reports the effect of collateral shocks on patent novelty. The dependent 
variable is patent originality in panel A, and patent generality in panel B. All columns present IV 
estimates. Init. Controls × RePrice are fixed effects computed as firm-level initial characteristics 
(five quintiles of age, asset, ROA, two-digit industry, and state of headquarter location) 
interacted with industrial commercial real estate prices. Definitions of variables are listed in the 
Appendix. Standard errors are bootstrapped within MSA-year level, and are displayed in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A: Patent originality 
 
Dep. Var Originality 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
ReValue 0.047 0.063* 0.068* 0.097** 0.122** 
  (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.043) (0.052) 
CashAssets 0.021 -0.016 0.027 -0.062* 0.013 
  (0.030) (0.036) (0.034) (0.038) (0.045) 
Leverage -0.018 0.003 0.018 0.000 -0.084** 
  (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.041) 
ROA -0.018 -0.008 0.015 -0.008 -0.080 
  (0.036) (0.045) (0.037) (0.053) (0.056) 
TobinQ 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.004 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Hindex 0.035 0.058 0.020 0.006 -0.075 
  (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.056) (0.061) 
Hindex Squared -0.018 -0.085 0.019 0.003 0.139 
  (0.068) (0.069) (0.071) (0.091) (0.098) 
InstOwn 0.005 -0.021 -0.017 -0.002 0.018 
  (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.035) 
LnAge -0.047 -0.098** -0.061 -0.036 -0.005 
  (0.038) (0.040) (0.047) (0.046) (0.049) 
PPEAssets 0.022 0.043 -0.026 0.002 -0.014 
  (0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.045) (0.051) 
LnSales -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.010 -0.010 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
MSA Prices -5.204** -15.480*** -28.559*** -57.801*** 175.910*** 
  (2.139) (2.980) (9.949) (2.318) (6.447) 
Init. Controls × 
RePrice           YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,482 4,862 4,215 3,605 3,013 
Adjusted R2 0.548 0.551 0.582 0.591 0.619 
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Panel C: Patent generality 
 
Dep. Var Generality 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
ReValue 0.008 0.064 0.110 0.040 0.111 
  (0.060) (0.067) (0.079) (0.098) (0.133) 
CashAssets 0.023 -0.055 -0.061 -0.029 -0.057 
  (0.054) (0.055) (0.072) (0.085) (0.089) 
Leverage 0.042 0.022 0.053 0.023 0.084 
  (0.038) (0.051) (0.061) (0.077) (0.102) 
ROA 0.147*** 0.055 0.072 0.099 -0.011 
  (0.056) (0.069) (0.087) (0.088) (0.120) 
TobinQ -0.002 0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.006 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) 
Hindex 0.026 -0.024 -0.246*** 0.046 -0.052 
  (0.068) (0.078) (0.093) (0.113) (0.157) 
Hindex Squared 0.025 -0.057 0.274** -0.143 0.063 
  (0.109) (0.120) (0.134) (0.167) (0.271) 
InstOwn 0.009 0.015 0.012 -0.059 -0.053 
  (0.033) (0.044) (0.045) (0.064) (0.081) 
LnAge 0.026 -0.027 -0.004 0.025 -0.137 
  (0.047) (0.060) (0.073) (0.080) (0.112) 
PPEAssets -0.002 0.068 0.003 0.023 -0.109 
  (0.052) (0.063) (0.073) (0.087) (0.127) 
LnSales -0.034*** -0.006 -0.014 0.013 0.032 
  (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.026) (0.036) 
MSA Prices -5.443*** -15.326*** -38.915*** -24.813 52.449*** 
  (1.960) (4.676) (8.960) (22.611) (15.984) 
Init. Controls × 
RePrice           YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,239 3,622 3,002 2,416 1,861 
Adjusted R2 0.538 0.557 0.588 0.613 0.649 
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Table 5 
Patent industry 
This table reports the effect of collateral shocks on patent industry distribution. The 
dependent variable is the percentage of patents that are in a different 2-digit SIC industry from 
the incumbent firm. Since patent is typically not associated with an SIC code, but is instead 
assigned to a three-digit technology class by USPTO database, I use a concordance table that 
connects the USPTO technology classes to two-digit SIC code following Hsu, Tian and Xu 
(2014). All columns present IV estimates. Init. Controls × RePrice are fixed effects computed as 
firm-level initial characteristics (five quintiles of age, asset, ROA, two-digit industry, and state of 
headquarter location) interacted with industrial commercial real estate prices. Definitions of 
variables are listed in the Appendix. Standard errors are bootstrapped within MSA-year level, 
and are displayed in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Dep. Var Industry 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
ReValue 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.058*** 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) 
CashAssets -0.159*** -0.159*** -0.121*** -0.110*** -0.072* 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.033) (0.039) 
Leverage 0.016 0.008 0.037 0.044* 0.050* 
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) 
ROA 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.123*** 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029) (0.036) 
TobinQ -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Hindex 0.132*** 0.101*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.091** 
  (0.031) (0.033) (0.036) (0.039) (0.044) 
Hindex Squared -0.135*** -0.114*** -0.125*** -0.120** -0.091 
  (0.036) (0.037) (0.041) (0.048) (0.056) 
InstOwn 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.037*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
LnAge -0.019 -0.019 -0.032* -0.024 -0.019 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) 
PPEAssets 0.004 -0.016 -0.029 -0.033 -0.052* 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) 
LnSales -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
MSA Prices -17.272*** -21.374*** -0.391 -3.049** -41.701*** 
  (0.252) (0.475) (2.145) (1.192) (4.085) 
Init. Controls × 
RePrice           YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,566 4,928 4,268 3,645 3,040 
Adjusted R2 0.638 0.639 0.633 0.633 0.640 
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Table 6 
Collateral shocks and innovative investment 
This table investigates the effect of collateral shocks on innovation input. The dependent 
variable is LnRD in column (1), LnCvcVol in column (2), LnCvcCount in column (3), LnAcqVol 
in column (4), LnAcqCount in column (5). The estimates are from IV regressions. All the 
independent variables are lagged by one year. Definitions of variables are in Appendix. In the IV 
specifications, standard errors are bootstrapped within MSA-year level, and are displayed in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dep. Var LnRD LnCvcVol LnCvcCount LnAcqVol LnAcqCount 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ReValue 0.502*** 0.910*** 0.852*** 0.939*** 1.102*** 
 (0.070) (0.049) (0.143) (0.048) (0.103) 
Cash 0.792*** 0.664*** 0.865*** 0.641*** 0.712*** 
 (0.079) (0.067) (0.117) (0.067) (0.092) 
Leverage -0.025 0.079 0.124 0.031 -0.159* 
 (0.062) (0.054) (0.098) (0.056) (0.087) 
ROA -1.142*** -0.809*** -1.115*** -0.771*** -0.819*** 
 (0.082) (0.077) (0.116) (0.078) (0.097) 
TobinQ 0.110*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.107*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.011) 
Hindex 0.029 0.064 0.039 0.049 -0.014 
 (0.088) (0.064) (0.149) (0.061) (0.157) 
Hindex Squared 0.089 -0.075 -0.053 -0.079 -0.147 
 (0.136) (0.092) (0.218) (0.083) (0.246) 
InstOwn -0.229*** -0.587*** -0.557*** -0.536*** -0.474*** 
 (0.044) (0.037) (0.104) (0.036) (0.078) 
LnAge 0.151** -0.011 -0.100 0.001 -0.007 
 (0.075) (0.057) (0.122) (0.055) (0.096) 
PPE -0.448*** -0.721*** -0.745*** -0.697*** -0.783*** 
 (0.066) (0.058) (0.141) (0.058) (0.099) 
LnSales -0.295*** -0.561*** -0.455*** -0.576*** -0.538*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.034) (0.020) (0.025) 
MSA Prices -3.411*** -0.414 -1.578 -0.274 -1.395 
 (0.650) (0.675) (1.065) (0.677) (1.129) 
Init. Controls × 
RePrice           
YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 11,451 11,451 11,441 11,451 11,314 
Adjusted R2 0.956 0.976 0.806 0.976 0.854 
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Table 7  
Acquisitions 
 This table investigates the effect of collateral shocks on deal characteristics of acquisition. 
The regressions are run at deal-year level. The dependent variable in column (1) is CashPercent, 
which is the percentage of cash in the funding of an acquisition. The dependent variable in 
column (2) is a dummy variable --- CashDummy, which is equal to one if the acquisition is 
partially funded by cash and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in column (3) is a dummy 
variable --- TargetInd, which is equal to one if the target belongs to a different 2-digit SIC 
industry from the parent firm. The dependent variable in column (4) is TargetPat, which is 
number of patents filed by a target prior to acquisition. The dependent variable in column (5) is 
TargetCite, which is the number of citation received by the patents filed by the target prior to 
acquisition. The estimates are from IV regressions. All the independent variables are lagged by 
one year. Definitions of variables are in Appendix. In the IV specifications, standard errors are 
bootstrapped within MSA-year level, and are displayed in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Dep. Var CashPercent CashDummy TargetInd TargetPat TargetCite 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
ReValue 0.268*** 0.403*** 0.199* 0.757*** 0.804* 
  (0.100) (0.107) (0.113) (0.285) (0.461) 
CashAssets 0.041 -0.044 -0.245* 1.410*** 1.480*** 
  (0.150) (0.158) (0.138) (0.276) (0.492) 
Leverage 0.255*** 0.287*** 0.093 0.273 0.445 
  (0.096) (0.104) (0.092) (0.193) (0.357) 
ROA 0.201 0.157 0.127 -0.749 -1.129 
  (0.221) (0.248) (0.223) (0.559) (0.901) 
TobinQ -0.011 -0.010 0.001 0.129*** 0.150** 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.037) (0.058) 
Hindex 0.190* 0.164 0.107 0.229 0.236 
  (0.100) (0.107) (0.113) (0.253) (0.445) 
Hindex Squared -0.298** -0.291** -0.094 -0.256 -0.393 
  (0.125) (0.139) (0.145) (0.325) (0.550) 
InstOwn 0.063 0.080 0.072 -0.180 -0.117 
  (0.074) (0.079) (0.082) (0.178) (0.303) 
LnAge -0.013 -0.061 0.107 -0.295 -0.089 
  (0.104) (0.119) (0.100) (0.182) (0.342) 
PPEAssets 0.168* 0.214* 0.003 1.941*** 2.177*** 
  (0.097) (0.112) (0.103) (0.261) (0.405) 
LnSales -0.036 -0.044 0.005 -0.809*** -0.871*** 
  (0.024) (0.029) (0.026) (0.068) (0.118) 
MSA Prices 28.141 26.031 -2.415 3.897 -0.982 
  (19.289) (20.005) (2.619) (7.376) (10.171) 
Init. Controls × 
RePrice           YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,936 4,936 4,936 4,936 4,936 
Adjusted R2 0.262 0.285 0.427 0.877 0.690 
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Table 8  
CVC investment 
 This table investigates the effect of collateral shocks on CVC investment. The regressions 
are run at deal-year level. The dependent variable in column (1) is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to one if the incumbent and the start-up firm operate in different two-digit SIC industries, 
and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in column (2) is the number of round the start-up 
firm is in when the incumbent firm invests in it. The dependent variable in column (3) is the age 
of the entrepreneurial firm when it receives funding from incumbents. The dependent variable in 
column (4) is a dummy variable, and it is equal to one if the startup went IPO and zero otherwise. 
The dependent variable in column (5) is a dummy variable, and it is equal to one if the startup 
was acquired or merged and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in column (6) is a dummy 
variable, and it is equal to one if the startup went bankrupt and zero otherwise. The estimates are 
from IV regressions. All the independent variables are lagged by one year. Definitions of 
variables are in Appendix. In the IV specifications, standard errors are bootstrapped within 
MSA-year level, and are displayed in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
59 
 
 
Dep. Var Industry Round Age IPO exit M&A exit Bankruptcy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
ReValue 0.413*** -0.384* -0.002*** -0.375 0.950*** -0.063 
  (0.148) (0.229) (0.001) (0.237) (0.304) (0.277) 
CashAssets 0.442 -0.078 0.000 0.150 0.241 -0.245 
  (0.287) (0.205) (0.001) (0.216) (0.315) (0.181) 
Leverage 0.297* -0.211* 0.001 0.182 0.290 0.019 
  (0.154) (0.126) (0.001) (0.186) (0.278) (0.184) 
ROA -0.597 -0.061 0.005*** 0.130 -0.850 0.271 
  (0.425) (0.325) (0.002) (0.357) (0.616) (0.415) 
TobinQ 0.010 0.010 0.000 -0.001 -0.039** 0.019 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.000) (0.014) (0.018) (0.012) 
Hindex -0.603** -0.467** 0.000 0.308 -0.387 -0.231 
  (0.303) (0.218) (0.001) (0.227) (0.344) (0.260) 
Hindex Squared 0.722** 0.516* -0.000 0.085 0.060 0.014 
  (0.310) (0.275) (0.001) (0.277) (0.377) (0.360) 
InstOwn -0.124 0.168 0.001 -0.229 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.172) (0.197) (0.001) (0.242) (0.372) (0.266) 
LnAge -0.516 0.181 -0.001 -0.432 -0.115 0.300 
  (0.384) (0.436) (0.003) (0.654) (0.797) (0.508) 
PPEAssets -0.003 0.286 0.003*** 0.021 -0.371 0.175 
  (0.298) (0.202) (0.001) (0.278) (0.326) (0.214) 
LnSales 0.095** -0.069 -0.001*** -0.073 0.140* -0.005 
  (0.038) (0.056) (0.000) (0.069) (0.081) (0.055) 
MSA Prices 8.465 -10.733 -  -  -  -  
  (5.145) (7.326) -  -  -  -  
Init. Controls × 
RePrice           YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,175 1,605 1,145 1,285 1,285 1,285 
Adjusted R2 0.409 0.144 0.796 0.275 0.164 0.169 
  
60 
 
Table 9  
Cross-sectional variations 
This table reports the subsample tests for the effect of collateral shocks on patenting 
outcomes, based on secured debt, financial constraints, and the industries in Panel A to Panel C, 
respectively. The coefficient estimates in all panels are based on IV regressions.   
In Panel A, the dependent variable is LnPatt+1~t+5 in column (1) - (2), and LnCitePatt+1~t+5 
in column (3) – (4). Secured debt category assignments use the ratio of long-term secured debt 
outstanding to total long-term debt outstanding in the current year, where firms above the median 
of the ratio are regarded as those with more collateral pledging and firms below the median are 
assigned as less collateral pledging firms.  
In Panel B, the dependent variable is LnPatt+1~t+5 in column (1) - (2), and LnCitePatt+1~t+5 
in column (3) – (4). As in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005), more demanding industries include 
pharmaceutical, medical instrumentation, chemicals, computers, communications, and electrical 
industries, and the rest are classified as less demanding industries, which include software 
programming, internet applications, and other low-tech industries.      
In Panel C1, the dependent variable is LnPatt+1~t+5, and in Panel C2 the dependent 
variable is LnCitePatt+1~t+5. Financial constraint assignments are based on firm dividend payout 
policy, firm size, and bond ratings. Firms not paying dividend are regarded as constrained firms, 
and firms paying dividend are unconstrained firms. Dividend payout ratio is computed as 
dividends on common stocks divided by income before extraordinary items adjusted for common 
stock equivalents. A firm is regarded as financially constrained if the size of its book assets falls 
in the bottom tercile of the whole distribution, and unconstrained if the size of its book assets 
falls in the top tercile of the whole distribution. Firms without bond rating (splticrm) are 
categorized as financially constrained, and financially unconstrained firms are those whose 
bonds are rated.  
In Panel D, the dependent variable is LnPatt+1~t+5 in column (1) - (2), and LnCitePatt+1~t+5 
in column (3) – (4). Cash holdings are measured as cash and all securities readily transferable to 
cash in the current asset section. A firm is regarded as with low cash holdings if the amount of its 
cash holdings falls in the bottom tercile of the whole distribution, and with high cash holdings if 
the amount of its cash holdings falls in the top tercile of the whole distribution. 
In Panel E, the dependent variable is LnPatt+1~t+5 in column (1) - (2), and LnCitePatt+1~t+5 
in column (3) – (4). Local real estate volatility is measured by the standard deviation of annual 
commercial real estate prices in an MSA area in the past five years. If a firm is in an MSA area 
where historical local real estate price volatility is lower than median value, than the firm is 
assigned to the low group. If a firm is in an MSA area where historical local real estate price 
volatility is higher than median value, than the firm is assigned to the high group.  
Init. Controls × RePrice are fixed effects computed as firm-level initial characteristics 
(five quintiles of age, asset, ROA, two-digit industry, and state of headquarter location) 
interacted with real estate prices.  
Definitions of control variables are in the Appendix. Robust standard errors clustered by 
MSA × year are displayed in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A: Secured debt  
 
 
 LnPatt+1~t+5  LnCitePatt+1~t+5 
 More secured  Less secured  More secured Less secured 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
ReValue 1.264*** 1.071***  1.227*** 0.818*** 
 (0.197) (0.238)  (0.225) (0.169) 
CashAssets 0.648*** 0.768***  0.871*** 0.761*** 
 (0.196) (0.235)  (0.208) (0.233) 
Leverage -0.081 0.059  -0.030 -0.158 
 (0.157) (0.180)  (0.175) (0.164) 
ROA 0.334 0.201  0.075 0.027 
 (0.213) (0.255)  (0.234) (0.241) 
TobinQ 0.092*** 0.115***  0.103*** 0.109*** 
 (0.016) (0.019)  (0.016) (0.019) 
Hindex 0.060 -0.450**  0.261 0.017 
 (0.200) (0.229)  (0.238) (0.209) 
Hindex Squared 0.278 0.747**  -0.185 -0.414 
 (0.306) (0.316)  (0.349) (0.277) 
InstOwn -0.503*** -0.445***  -0.689*** -0.154 
 (0.148) (0.154)  (0.156) (0.121) 
LnAge -0.464** 0.871**  -1.002*** 0.127 
 (0.215) (0.351)  (0.231) (0.316) 
PPEAssets 1.497*** 1.296***  1.589*** 1.699*** 
 (0.199) (0.226)  (0.220) (0.207) 
LnSales -0.476*** -0.491***  -0.500*** -0.544*** 
 (0.040) (0.055)  (0.046) (0.053) 
MSA Prices 11.820*** -16.229***  20.129*** -3.617 
 (4.309) (5.400)  (4.730) (3.815) 
Init. Controls × RePrice           YES YES  YES YES 
Firm FE YEs YEs  YEs YEs 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Test “ More = Less” 7.19***  9.84*** 
Observations 3,888 4,060  3,888 4,060 
Adjusted R2 0.880 0.860  0.871 0.911 
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Panel B:  Innovation difficulty  
 
 
Dep. Var. LnPatt+1~t+5  LnCitePatt+1~t+5 
 More demanding Less demanding  More demanding Less demanding 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
ReValue 0.818*** 0.522***  1.117*** 0.211 
 (0.128) (0.168)  (0.118) (0.185) 
CashAssets 0.856*** 0.847***  0.808*** 1.073*** 
 (0.114) (0.209)  (0.133) (0.256) 
Leverage -0.027 -0.255*  0.173* -0.341** 
 (0.091) (0.145)  (0.100) (0.151) 
ROA 0.374*** 0.167  0.433*** 0.080 
 (0.118) (0.199)  (0.137) (0.245) 
TobinQ 0.130*** 0.101***  0.141*** 0.123*** 
 (0.009) (0.015)  (0.010) (0.021) 
Hindex 0.059 0.112  0.218 0.003 
 (0.169) (0.198)  (0.175) (0.207) 
Hindex Squared -0.008 -0.241  -0.472* -0.192 
 (0.259) (0.310)  (0.249) (0.301) 
InstOwn -0.702*** -0.459***  -0.902*** -0.469*** 
 (0.092) (0.113)  (0.087) (0.124) 
LnAge -0.608*** -0.185*  -0.991*** -0.690*** 
 (0.077) (0.105)  (0.070) (0.145) 
PPEAssets 1.506*** 1.564***  1.727*** 1.597*** 
 (0.128) (0.223)  (0.142) (0.240) 
LnSales -0.615*** -0.692***  -0.615*** -0.830*** 
 (0.026) (0.043)  (0.031) (0.052) 
MSA Prices -1.378** 0.118  -0.591 -0.681 
 (0.593) (0.707)  (0.592) (0.666) 
Init. Controls × 
RePrice           
YES YES  YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Test “More = Less ” 8.41***  7.15*** 
Observations 7,216 4,442  7,216 4,442 
Adjusted R2 0.829 0.869  0.880 0.881 
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Panel C1: Ex-ante financing constraints - patents 
 
 
Dep. Var. LnPatt+1~t+5 
 Payout policy  Firm size  Bond ratings 
 Const. Unconst.  Const. Unconst.  Const. Unconst. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
ReValue 0.910*** 0.864***  1.196*** 0.666**  1.674*** 0.864*** 
 (0.144) (0.208)  (0.158) (0.290)  (0.202) (0.132) 
CashAssets 0.724*** 1.875***  0.443*** 0.885**  0.828*** 0.809*** 
 (0.110) (0.338)  (0.147) (0.343)  (0.174) (0.129) 
Leverage -0.141 -0.040  0.059 -0.125  0.155 -0.256*** 
 (0.103) (0.176)  (0.134) (0.216)  (0.137) (0.095) 
ROA 0.318*** -0.254 0.405*** 0.491  0.056 0.324** 
 (0.114) (0.441)  (0.131) (0.564)  (0.127) (0.125) 
TobinQ 0.136*** 0.039**  0.113*** 0.074***  0.090*** 0.119*** 
 (0.010) (0.020)  (0.012) (0.024)  (0.015) (0.009) 
Hindex 0.081 -0.017  -0.004 -0.218  0.351 -0.040 
 (0.191) (0.214)  (0.235) (0.288)  (0.298) (0.145) 
Hindex Squared -0.044 -0.064  0.325 -0.067  -0.297 -0.000 
 (0.306) (0.312)  (0.366) (0.411)  (0.494) (0.209) 
InstOwn -0.923*** -0.132  -1.560*** -0.264*  -0.904*** -0.412*** 
 (0.109) (0.136)  (0.197) (0.141)  (0.127) (0.088) 
LnAge -0.604*** 0.344  -0.806*** 0.400  -0.246 -0.111 
 (0.161) (0.307)  (0.238) (0.353)  (0.266) (0.156) 
PPEAssets 1.711*** 0.508**  1.300*** 1.266***  1.781*** 1.357*** 
 (0.147) (0.222)  (0.201) (0.260)  (0.174) (0.139) 
LnSales -0.578*** -0.430*** -0.520*** -0.454*** -0.699*** -0.573*** 
 (0.028) (0.076) (0.044) (0.102) (0.041) (0.026) 
MSA Prices -2.649 -8.163 5.873** -45.852* 4.887 0.055 
 (10.639) (7.671)  (2.840) (26.814)  (5.774) (2.692) 
Init. Controls × 
RePrice           
YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Test “C.=U. ” 6.39***  4.66***  12.35*** 
Observations 5,901 4,551  3,352 3,410  3,566 7,810 
Adjusted R2 0.850 0.856  0.761 0.841  0.887 0.879 
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Panel C2: Ex-ante financing constraints – citations per patent 
 
 
Dep. Var. LnCitePatt+1~t+5 
 Payout policy  Firm size  Bond ratings 
 Const. Unconst.  Const. Unconst.  Const. Unconst. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
ReValue 1.156*** 0.496***  1.154*** 0.533***  1.552*** 0.940*** 
 (0.148) (0.166)  (0.222) (0.171)  (0.214) (0.118) 
CashAssets 0.782*** 1.687***  0.343* 1.380***  0.834*** 0.831*** 
 (0.131) (0.344)  (0.182) (0.240)  (0.212) (0.138) 
Leverage 0.075 -0.016  0.229 0.125  0.279* -0.249** 
 (0.115) (0.170)  (0.155) (0.162)  (0.168) (0.098) 
ROA 0.188 0.812*  0.426*** 0.012  0.248 0.168 
 (0.127) (0.415)  (0.162) (0.450)  (0.204) (0.138) 
TobinQ 0.149*** 0.064***  0.140*** 0.096***  0.136*** 0.120*** 
 (0.012) (0.018)  (0.015) (0.018)  (0.019) (0.011) 
Hindex 0.390* 0.059  0.259 -0.168  0.852*** 0.137 
 (0.216) (0.195)  (0.301) (0.197)  (0.314) (0.135) 
Hindex Squared -0.645* -0.486*  -0.080 -0.273  -1.269** -0.447** 
 (0.338) (0.249)  (0.479) (0.274)  (0.495) (0.182) 
InstOwn -1.014*** -0.056  -1.533*** -0.101  -0.949*** -0.441*** 
 (0.110) (0.096)  (0.221) (0.092)  (0.142) (0.084) 
LnAge -1.386*** -0.093  -1.495*** -0.332  -1.219*** -0.887*** 
 (0.184) (0.300)  (0.290) (0.363)  (0.315) (0.166) 
PPEAssets 1.794*** 0.847***  1.452*** 1.238***  1.650*** 1.613*** 
 (0.187) (0.213)  (0.250) (0.178)  (0.208) (0.140) 
LnSales -0.587*** -0.620***  -0.501*** -0.506*** -0.667*** -0.640*** 
 (0.030) (0.057)  (0.048) (0.065) (0.048) (0.028) 
MSA Prices 14.890* 4.968  13.306*** -34.187** 7.145* 6.936*** 
 (8.432) (5.068)  (3.279) (15.651)  (4.076) (2.189) 
Init. Controls × 
RePrice           
YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Test “C.=U. ” 7.24***  6.95***  14.48*** 
Observations 5,901 4,551  3,352 3,410  3,566 7,810 
Adjusted R2 0.849 0.915  0.739 0.876  0.867 0.907 
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Panel D: Cash holdings 
 
 
Dep. Var LnPatt+1~t+5   LnCitePatt+1~t+5 
  Low cash High cash   Low cash High cash 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
            
ReValue 0.934*** 0.366   1.145*** 0.222 
  (0.166) (0.243)   (0.217) (0.203) 
CashAssets 0.907*** 0.798***   0.727*** 0.995*** 
  (0.190) (0.257)   (0.224) (0.221) 
Leverage 0.074 -0.202   0.063 -0.001 
  (0.144) (0.190)   (0.181) (0.170) 
ROA 0.051 0.801**   0.257 0.493* 
  (0.170) (0.349)   (0.197) (0.291) 
TobinQ 0.104*** 0.107***   0.137*** 0.122*** 
  (0.017) (0.018)   (0.021) (0.016) 
Hindex -0.061 -0.031   0.138 -0.073 
  (0.197) (0.298)   (0.241) (0.220) 
Hindex Squared 0.177 -0.021   -0.360 -0.345 
  (0.294) (0.413)   (0.373) (0.271) 
InstOwn -0.190 -0.498***   -0.542** -0.355*** 
  (0.205) (0.132)   (0.252) (0.103) 
LnAge -0.075 0.060   -0.338 -0.943*** 
  (0.258) (0.313)   (0.297) (0.271) 
PPEAssets 0.954*** 1.907***   1.034*** 1.953*** 
  (0.214) (0.263)   (0.249) (0.265) 
LnSales -0.707*** -0.611***   -0.679*** -0.624*** 
  (0.053) (0.051)   (0.061) (0.047) 
MSA Prices -9.585 -23.810***   40.543 -6.192** 
  (14.571) (3.890)   (27.137) (2.582) 
Init. Controls × 
RePrice           YES YES   YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES   YES YES 
Year FE YES YES   YES YES 
Test "Low=High" 4.39***   5.66*** 
Observations 3,184 3,617   3,184 3,617 
Adjusted R2 0.885 0.859   0.851 0.912 
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Panel E: Local real estate price volatility 
 
 
Dep. Var LnPatt+1~t+5   LnCitePatt+1~t+5 
  Low volatility High volatility   Low volatility High volatility 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
            
ReValue 1.232*** 0.451***   1.569*** 0.344 
  (0.172) (0.155)   (0.272) (0.281) 
CashAssets 0.739*** 0.908***   0.804*** 1.181*** 
  (0.148) (0.167)   (0.258) (0.255) 
Leverage -0.332*** -0.000   -0.459** -0.103 
  (0.109) (0.134)   (0.186) (0.224) 
ROA 0.129 0.365**   0.315 -0.035 
  (0.155) (0.152)   (0.240) (0.238) 
TobinQ 0.105*** 0.127***   0.179*** 0.152*** 
  (0.013) (0.010)   (0.020) (0.017) 
Hindex 0.071 -0.011   0.327 -0.173 
  (0.180) (0.208)   (0.295) (0.359) 
Hindex Squared -0.181 0.361   -0.727* 0.437 
  (0.273) (0.305)   (0.415) (0.523) 
InstOwn -0.351*** -0.840***   -0.635*** -1.203*** 
  (0.105) (0.118)   (0.181) (0.221) 
LnAge 0.011 -0.739***   -0.393 -1.728*** 
  (0.161) (0.203)   (0.305) (0.332) 
PPEAssets 1.432*** 1.604***   1.558*** 2.021*** 
  (0.163) (0.149)   (0.270) (0.249) 
LnSales -0.546*** -0.642***   -0.609*** -0.704*** 
  (0.038) (0.029)   (0.058) (0.046) 
MSA Prices -7.834 9.015**   14.353 16.149*** 
  (6.851) (3.951)   (11.238) (5.653) 
Init. Controls × 
RePrice           YES YES   YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES   YES YES 
Year FE YES YES   YES YES 
Test "Low=High" 12.1***   14.15*** 
Observations 6,087 5,289   6,087 5,289 
Adjusted R2 0.881 0.862   0.799 0.786 
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                                                 Internet Appendix for 
“Managing innovation: The role of collateral” 
This internet appendix provides robustness tests and supplemental analyses to the main 
results presented in “Managing innovation: The role of collateral”.  
 
 
 
Table A1 
Collateral shocks and financing behavior 
This table presents the effect of collateral shocks on capital structure. The estimates are 
from IV regressions. The dependent variables are NetLtDebt (column 1), StIssue (column 2), 
LtSecureD (column 3), LtUnsecureD (column 4), NetStkIssue (column 5), NetFinancing (column 
6). All the independent variables are lagged by one year except ReValue, CashAssets, and MSA 
Prices. Init. Controls × RePrice are fixed effects computed as firm-level initial characteristics 
(five quintiles of age, asset, ROA, two-digit industry, and state of headquarter location) 
interacted with industrial commercial real estate prices. Definitions of variables are in Appendix. 
In the IV specifications, standard errors are bootstrapped within MSA-year level, and are 
displayed in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Dep. Var. NetLtIssue NetStIssue LtSecureD LtUnsecureD NetStkIssue NetFinancing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ReValue 0.027*** 0.011*** 0.023** -0.067*** 0.008 0.005*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.001) 
CashAssets -0.019*** -0.009*** -0.010* -0.042*** -0.083*** -0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.002) 
TobinQ 0.006*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.003*** 0.030*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
MSA Prices 0.682** 0.071* -0.622* 0.599* -0.725*** -0.039*** 
 (0.328) (0.038) (0.323) (0.348) (0.245) (0.013) 
Init. Controls 
× RePrice           
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 12,152 12,949 11,931 11,919 11,515 10,827 
Adjusted R2 0.074 -0.002 0.503 0.555 0.449 0.548 
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Table A2  
Robustness checks 
This table reports the robustness checks of the effect of collateral shocks on the 
innovation. The dependent variable is LnPatt+1~t+5 in column (1) – (2), and LnCitePatt+1~t+5  in 
column (3) – (4). Panel A examines whether the effects are driven by firms with their 
headquarters located in Massachusetts or California. Column (1) and column (3) are regressions 
on firms with their headquarters not located in Massachusetts or California, and column (2) and 
column (4) are regressions on firms with their headquarters located in Massachusetts or 
California. Panel B reports the effects of collateral on small firms in large cities, and large firms 
in small cities respectively. Column (1) and column (3) report regressions on small firms in large 
cities, and column (2) and column (4) report regressions on large firms in small cities. Panel C 
reports sub-period results. Column (1) and (3) are for the period from 1993 to 2000, and column 
(2) and (4) are for the period from 2001 to 2009. Panel D reports results using ReOwn instead of 
ReValue in the independent variable list. Column (1) and (3) are OLS, and column (2) and (4) 
are IV regressions. 
Definitions of variables are in Appendix. The regression estimates are based on IV 
regressions except for column (1) and column (3) in Panel D. For IV regressions, standard errors 
are bootstrapped within MSA-year level, and are displayed in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A 
 
Dep. Var. LnPatt+1~t+5  LnCitePatt+1~t+5   
 No CA, MA CA + MA  No CA, MA CA + MA 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
ReValue 0.820*** 0.463*  0.883*** 0.635** 
 (0.122) (0.236)  (0.123) (0.272) 
CashAssets 0.711*** 0.976***  0.844*** 0.801*** 
 (0.108) (0.185)  (0.132) (0.207) 
Leverage -0.208** -0.153  -0.131 0.025 
 (0.094) (0.141)  (0.104) (0.149) 
ROA 0.156 0.395**  0.267* 0.137 
 (0.119) (0.173)  (0.137) (0.185) 
TobinQ 0.118*** 0.136***  0.142*** 0.132*** 
 (0.010) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.013) 
Hindex 0.155 -0.046  0.249* 0.550* 
 (0.151) (0.280)  (0.143) (0.286) 
Hindex Squared -0.256 0.237  -0.586*** -0.824* 
 (0.222) (0.451)  (0.188) (0.432) 
InstOwn -0.372*** -1.062***  -0.413*** -1.042*** 
 (0.083) (0.105)  (0.088) (0.121) 
LnAge 0.124 -0.889***  -0.592*** -1.990*** 
 (0.135) (0.190)  (0.157) (0.235) 
PPEAssets 1.488*** 1.472***  1.442*** 1.836*** 
 (0.119) (0.201)  (0.143) (0.245) 
LnSales -0.627*** -0.561***  -0.694*** -0.579*** 
 (0.031) (0.034)  (0.037) (0.029) 
MSA Prices -10.142 8.023  9.343** 9.354** 
 (6.476) (5.243)  (4.752) (4.467) 
Init. Controls × RePrice           YES YES  YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 8,007 3,369  8,007 3,369 
Adjusted R2 0.877 0.819  0.903 0.855 
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Panel B 
 
Dep. Var. LnPatt+1~t+5  LnCitePatt+1~t+5   
 Small Firm Large Firm  Small Firm Large Firm 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
ReValue 0.506*** 0.651*  0.913*** 1.847*** 
 (0.156) (0.382)  (0.163) (0.413) 
CashAssets 0.869*** 1.492***  0.691*** 1.306*** 
 (0.140) (0.444)  (0.169) (0.400) 
Leverage -0.018 -0.645**  0.010 -0.631** 
 (0.110) (0.290)  (0.119) (0.263) 
ROA 0.304** -0.470  0.193 0.185 
 (0.135) (0.722)  (0.149) (0.627) 
TobinQ 0.145*** 0.094***  0.139*** 0.085** 
 (0.011) (0.035)  (0.013) (0.037) 
Hindex 0.171 0.039  0.132 0.920*** 
 (0.198) (0.369)  (0.181) (0.303) 
Hindex Squared -0.197 -0.270  -0.284 -1.552*** 
 (0.306) (0.528)  (0.275) (0.455) 
InstOwn -0.721*** -0.339  -0.698*** 0.279 
 (0.109) (0.224)  (0.122) (0.228) 
LnAge -0.323* 0.226  -1.489*** -0.816** 
 (0.174) (0.484)  (0.216) (0.359) 
PPEAssets 1.466*** 0.844***  1.714*** 1.083*** 
 (0.156) (0.326)  (0.185) (0.367) 
LnSales -0.626*** -0.516***  -0.653*** -0.319*** 
 (0.033) (0.097)  (0.038) (0.104) 
MSA Prices 6.493** -26.117*  10.995*** -8.579 
 (3.040) (15.800)  (2.645) (9.267) 
Init. Controls × RePrice           YES YES  YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 5,300 1,119  5,300 1,119 
Adjusted R2 0.873 0.852  0.903 0.838 
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Panel C 
 
Dep. Var. LnPatt+1~t+5  LnCitePatt+1~t+5   
 1993 - 2000 2001 - 2009  1993 - 2000 2001 - 2009 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
ReValue 0.834*** 1.472***  0.894*** 1.318*** 
 (0.112) (0.361)  (0.143) (0.152) 
CashAssets 0.689*** 0.746***  0.683*** 0.805*** 
 (0.116) (0.205)  (0.148) (0.191) 
Leverage -0.191** 0.028  -0.048 0.186 
 (0.086) (0.218)  (0.114) (0.151) 
ROA 0.378*** 0.138  0.357** -0.023 
 (0.102) (0.203)  (0.142) (0.182) 
TobinQ 0.095*** 0.076***  0.109*** 0.090*** 
 (0.008) (0.021)  (0.011) (0.019) 
Hindex 0.053 0.172  0.299* -0.029 
 (0.154) (0.191)  (0.161) (0.171) 
Hindex Squared -0.007 -0.200  -0.503** -0.049 
 (0.237) (0.308)  (0.240) (0.242) 
InstOwn -0.465*** -0.498**  -0.540*** -0.117 
 (0.099) (0.202)  (0.107) (0.109) 
LnAge -0.443*** 2.155**  -1.179*** 0.480 
 (0.137) (0.846)  (0.173) (0.513) 
PPEAssets 1.688*** 0.735**  1.783*** 1.138*** 
 (0.104) (0.347)  (0.141) (0.364) 
LnSales -0.586*** -0.281***  -0.607*** -0.319*** 
 (0.027) (0.063)  (0.031) (0.060) 
MSA Prices -10.720** 6.521  11.385*** -0.662 
 (5.109) (9.243)  (4.110) (9.513) 
Init. Controls × RePrice           YES YES  YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 8,486 2,890  8,486 2,890 
Adjusted R2 0.887 0.915  0.882 0.969 
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Panel D 
 
Dep. Var. LnPatt+1~t+5  LnCitePatt+1~t+5   
 OLS IV  OLS IV 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
ReOwn 1.218*** 1.168***  0.897*** 0.787** 
 (0.289) (0.324)  (0.309) (0.364) 
CashAssets 0.896*** 0.881***  0.905*** 0.896*** 
 (0.100) (0.099)  (0.119) (0.117) 
Leverage -0.168** -0.188**  -0.110 -0.105 
 (0.076) (0.076)  (0.084) (0.084) 
ROA 0.283*** 0.298***  0.252** 0.263** 
 (0.098) (0.096)  (0.114) (0.113) 
TobinQ 0.124*** 0.125***  0.134*** 0.136*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Hindex 0.100 0.059  0.296** 0.294** 
 (0.132) (0.133)  (0.131) (0.130) 
Hindex Squared -0.127 -0.025  -0.581*** -0.575*** 
 (0.201) (0.200)  (0.180) (0.177) 
InstOwn -0.558*** -0.590***  -0.655*** -0.649*** 
 (0.076) (0.078)  (0.075) (0.078) 
LnAge -0.299*** -0.089  -0.773*** -0.894*** 
 (0.104) (0.125)  (0.122) (0.147) 
PPEAssets 1.558*** 1.612***  1.729*** 1.725*** 
 (0.102) (0.102)  (0.120) (0.121) 
LnSales -0.654*** -0.654***  -0.710*** -0.712*** 
 (0.022) (0.022)  (0.025) (0.025) 
MSA Prices -11.392** 1.622  6.003 15.142*** 
 (4.679) (4.221)  (4.613) (2.902) 
Init. Controls × RePrice           YES YES  YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 11,539 11,539  11,539 11,539 
Adjusted R2 0.864 0.866  0.892 0.893 
 
 
